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Voluntary Intoxication: A Defense to Intentional Injury 
Exclusion Clauses in Homeowner's Policies? 
Tracy E. Silverman 
Insurance affects the life of every person living in the United States 
today. 1 What would America be like without insurance? People 
would not only be reluctant to buy homes2 or automobiles,3 but they 
might refuse to work in dangerous yet vital industries such as chemical 
research and construction.4 Moreover, the insurance industry is a ma-
jor source of employment5 and one of the country's largest investors. 6 
Insurance has also played an important role in the courts, not only 
"contribut[ing] to the development of fundamental legal doctrines,"7 
but also providing courts with a forum in which to address public poli-
cies such as providing compensation for accident victims and assuring 
equal treatment regardless of gender or race. 8 
Judicial concern with public policy has been particularly apparent 
in litigation involving homeowner's policies. A typical multiple-line 
homeowner's policy insures the "named insured," who owns and oc-
cupies a private residence, and the named insured's relatives against 
fire, theft, and comprehensive personal liability.9 Such homeowner's 
1. See generally KENNETH s. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 1 (1990); ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 11 
(1987); ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIOISS, INSURANCE LAW§ l.l(a) (1988). 
2. See DAVID L. BICKELHAUPT, GENERAL INSURANCE 85 (11th ed. 1983). Without fire or 
casualty insurance, a fire, earthquake, or tornado could destroy a house and its contents in a 
matter of minutes, leaving the owners with nothing. Similarly, banks would be unwilling to 
accept homes or businesses as collateral for loans. Id. 
3. In the absence of automobile insurance, finance companies would avoid approving auto-
mobile installment loans, and owners would constantly worry that causing an accident could 
result in large monetary liability for losses suffered by other drivers. Id. 
4. See id. 
5. Two million persons, or one in every fifty employed, hold insurance-related jobs. With 
over 5900 insurance companies and thousands of related businesses, the American insurance 
industry provides work in areas ranging from sales to accounting to research to management. 
Insurance employment exceeds that found in major industries such as banking, mining, and 
chemical production. Id. at 90. 
6. Insurance companies receive insurance payments from policyholders or premiums in ex-
cess of $500 billion per year. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 1; see also infra note 34 (discussing the 
role of premiums in the insurance industry). As of 1985, the insurance industry's total assets 
exceeded $1.3 trillion. JERRY, supra note I,§ 11. As a result, insurers invest several hundred 
billion dollars in areas of the American economy as diverse as hospitals, education, and space 
travel. BICKELHAUPT, supra note 2, at 87, 90. 
7. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note I, § l.l(a). For example, resolution of insurance disputes 
established many common law contract rules and foundational principles of consumer law. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. BICKELHAUPT, supra note 2, at 704-12; see also JERRY, supra note l, § 60B[b] (explaining 
the multiple coverage provided by homeowner's policies); EMMET J. VAUGHAN, FUNDAMEN-
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policies provide coverage not only for accidental personal and prop-
erty damage occurring on the insured's premises, but also for acci-
dents occurring away from the insured's home for which the insured is 
held responsible. 10 To illustrate, assume Ms. A is insured under a 
homeowner's policy. While at a park, Ms. A accidentally pushes inno-
cent third-party Mr. B causing him to hit his head. Ms. A's insurer 
will be obligated to pay Mr. B any damages for which Ms. A is found 
liable. 
Homeowner's insurance policies generally exclude coverage for in-
jury or damage intentionally caused by an insured. 11 This exclusion is 
premised on the principle that insurance protects solely against fortui-
tous events. 12 Allowing coverage for intentional acts not only frus-
trates insurance companies' efforts to calculate premiums accurately, 
but also contravenes the public policy goal of deterrence that underlies 
tort law.13 However, concerns over coverage also implicate the public 
interest in compensating injured victims. When a wrongdoer like Ms. 
A cannot afford to compensate her victim, her insurance is often the 
injured party's only means of recovery. 14 
In light of these competing policy concerns, courts have developed 
three standards for determining the intent necessary to deny insurance 
coverage. A minority of jurisdictions, favoring the deterrence goal, 
applies an objective test. 15 These courts construe intent broadly, ap-
plying the exclusion whenever the resulting injuries are the "natural 
and probable consequences" of the insured's act. A second group of 
courts narrowly construes the exclusionary clause in order to compen-
TAIS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 425 (5th ed. 1989) (noting that homeowner's insurance includes 
personal liability coverage). See Homeowners Form H0-3, reprinted in ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN 
INSURERS, 1989 POLICY KIT FOR STUDENTS OF INSURANCE 18-32 (1988) [hereinafter Home-
owner's Policy], for a prototype of the standard homeowner's policy form. 
10. BICKELHAUPT, supra note 2, at 712-13; see also infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text 
(discussing the requirement that damages result from an accident). 
11. See generally KEETON & Wrn1ss, supra note 1, § 5.4(d); JERRY, supra note 1, § 63B; 
Sam P. Rynearson, Exclusion of Expected or Intended Personal Injury or Property Damage Under 
the Occu"ence Definition of the Standard Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 19 FORUM 513 
(1984). 
12. KEETON & W1mss, supra note I, § 5.4(d)(I); James A. Fischer, The Exclusion from 
Insurance Coverage of Losses Caused by the Intentional Acts of the Insured: A Policy in Search of 
a Justification, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95 (1990); Catherine A. Salton, Comment, Mental 
Incapacity and Liability Insurance Exclusionary Clauses: The Effect of Insanity upon Intent, 78 
CAL. L. REV. 1027 (1990). 
13. Courts have emphasized that, if people could insure themselves against intentional 
wrongdoing, "the deterrence attributable to financial responsibility would be missing." E.g., 
Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 388 A.2d 603, 6Q6 (N.J. 1978); see also KEETON & Wrn1ss, 
supra note 1, § 5.4(d)(l); Fischer, supra note 12, at 95; Kristin Wilcox, Note, Intentional Injury 
Exclusion Clauses - What is Insurance Intent?, 32 WAYNE L. REV. 1523, 1528 (1986). 
14. Salton, supra note 12, at 1030-31; Wilcox, supra note 13, at 1528. 
15. See, e.g., Rankin v. Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co., 393 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1968); Boyd 
v. Great Cent. Ins. Co., 401 So. 2d 19 (Ala. 1981); Casualty Reciprocal Exch. v. Thomas, 647 
P.2d 1361 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Miller, 438 N.W.2d 638 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1989); Hins v. Heer, 259 N.W.2d 38 (N.D. 1977). 
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sate the victim as often as possible.16 Courts taking this view apply a 
strict subjective approach, finding intent only when an insured intends 
both the act and the precise injury that results. The majority of juris-
dictions has adopted a hybrid "inferred intent" approach that ad-
dresses both policy interests.17 These courts combine elements of the 
objective and subjective tests, deeming the insured to have intended 
the actual injuries where the nature of his act suggests that some harm 
was virtually certain to result. 
The dispute becomes more complicated when an insured commits 
an apparently intentional act while voluntarily intoxicated. In these 
cases, courts must decide whether a lack of capacity to form the re-
quired intent due solely to the effects of alcohol should insulate an 
insured from the intentional injury exclusion clause. Because courts 
did not consider these mentally deficient insureds when developing the 
three intent standards, they often find it difficult to reconcile their 
views regarding allowance of a voluntary intoxication defense with 
their traditional interpretations of intent. Courts ignore the inability 
of alcohol abusers to control their drinking patterns even when faced 
with possible financial liability. Therefore, attempts to craft a defense 
that addresses both deterrence and victim compensation concerns 
have failed even among those courts employing the inferred intent 
approach. 
This Note argues that the current voluntary intoxication defense to 
the intentional injury exclusion clause should be modified to allow in-
surers subrogation rights against insureds who commit intentional acts 
while voluntarily intoxicated, subject to an exception for alcoholic in-
sureds who successfully complete alcohol treatment programs. Part I 
discusses the public policy concerns of victim compensation and deter-
rence and how they influence courts deciding between the three tradi-
tional approaches to "intent." Part II analyzes the impact of these 
intent standards on courts' decisions to allow a voluntary intoxication 
defense and concludes that the defense as currently formulated pro-
motes victim compensation at the expense of deterrence. Part III ar-
gues that public policy considerations mandate an exception to the 
general rule that insurers cannot bring subrogation actions against 
16. See e.g., State Auto Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mcintyre, 652 F. Supp. 1177, 1194, 1218-19 (N.D. 
Ala. 1987); Breland v. Schilling, 550 So. 2d 609, 612-13 (La. 1989); Patrons-Oxford Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Dodge, 426 A.2d 888, 892 (Me. 1981); MacKinnon v. Hanover Ins. Co., 471A.2d1166, 
1167 (N.H. 1984); Lumberman's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Blackbum, 477 P.2d 62, 65 (Okla. 1970). 
17. See e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Bomke, 849 F.2d 1218 (9th Cir. 1988); Stein-
metz v. National Am. Ins. Co., 589 P.2d 911 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); Butler v. Behaeghe, 548 P.2d 
934 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976); Rajspic v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 718 P.2d 1167 (Idaho 1986); 
Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975); Barton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 527 
So. 2d 524 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 532 So. 2d 157 (La. 1988); State Farm Fire & Casualty 
Co. v. Williams, 355 N.W.2d 421 (Minn. 1984); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Victor, 442 
N.W.2d 880 (Neb. 1989); Western Natl. Assurance Co. v. Hecker, 719 P.2d 954 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1986); Raby v. Moe, 450 N.W.2d 452 (Wis. 1990). 
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their own insureds for intentional acts committed when voluntarily 
intoxicated. These considerations also favor limitations on subroga-
tion to encourage alcohol-abuse treatment. This Note concludes that 
allowing insurers to bring subrogation actions, subject to an exception 
for alcoholic insureds who successfully complete alcohol rehabilitation 
programs, best accommodates the conflicting public policy goals of 
victim compensation and deterrence. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERPRETATION OF THE MODERN 
INTENTIONAL INJURY EXCLUSION CLAUSE 
Courts interpreting intentional injury exclusion clauses in home-
owner's policies define intent in light of competing public policy con-
cerns: deterring wrongdoers and compensating injured victims. A 
court's decision regarding how much weight to give to each goal deter-
mines its choice of intent standard. This Part examines these compet-
ing insurance law public policy interests and analyzes their effect on 
the three approaches. Section I.A discusses the development of the 
intentional injury exclusion clause and the public policy concerns that 
influence courts' attempts to define intent. Section I.B sets out the 
three "intent" standards - objective, subjective, and inferred - in 
light of these concerns and discusses applications of each test. This 
Part concludes that only the inferred intent approach addresses both 
the public interest in deterring wrongful conduct and the public inter-
est in adequately compensating injured victims. 
A. Public Policy's Role in Interpreting the Intentional Injury 
Exclusion Clause 
Prior to 1966, standard liability insurance policies18 only provided 
coverage for bodily injury or property damage "caused by accident."19 
Because policies did not define the term accident, courts favoring cov-
erage looked to whether the injury was "accidental" from the stand-
point of the victim rather than from the standpoint of the insured.20 
These courts required coverage whenever there was no evidence that 
the victim provoked the injury.2 1 
In 1966, the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and the 
18. The liability insurance policy referred to in this section is included as part of the standard 
homeowner's policy. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
19. See generally Donald F. Farbstein & Francis J. Stillman, Insurance for the Commission 
of Intentional Torts, 20 HASflNGS L.J. 1219, 1219-22 (1969); Rynearson, supra note 11, at 513-
18, 521-22; H. Karen Cuttler, Case Comment, Liability Insurance for Intentional Torts-Subro-
gation of the Insurer to the Victim's Rights Against the Insured: Ambassador Insurance Co. v. 
Montes, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 155, 159-62 (1979); Wilcox, supra note 13, at 1524-25. 
20. See, e.g., New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943); Hartford 
Accident & lndem. Co. v. Wolbarst, 57 A.2d 151 (N.H. 1948); see also Farbstein & Stillman, 
supra note 19, at 1221 (discussing cases that take this view). 
21. Cuttler, supra note 19, at 160 n.37 (citing cases). 
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Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau revised the standard liability policy 
to provide coverage for an "occurrence" rather than an "accident."22 
The language provides that "[the insurance c]ompany agrees to pay on 
behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured shall become legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property dam- . 
age, to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence .... "23 
Occurrence is defined as "an accident, including injurious exposure to 
conditions which results during the policy period in bodily injury or 
property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of 
the insured."24 The revised standard makes clear that whether an in-
jury is intentional is determined from the standpoint of the insured 
rather than from the standpoint of the victim.25 However, the Ian-
22. Rynearson, supra note 11, at S13; Wilcox, supra note 13, at 1S24. 
23. WILLIAM F. YOUNG, JR., CASES AND MATERIAIS ON INSURANCE 684 (1971); see also 
Farbstein & Stillman, supra note 19, at 1236-37 (quoting NATIONAL BUREAU OF CASUALTY 
UNDERWRITERS, STANDARD PROVISIONS FOR GENERAL LIABILITY POLICIES (1966)). 
24. Farbstein & Stillman, supra note 19, at 1237 (quoting NATIONAL BUREAU OF CASUALTY 
UNDERWRITERS, STANDARD PROVISIONS FOR GENERAL LIABILITY POLICIES (1966)); see also 
Rynearson, supra note 11, at S13. In 1984, the policy was changed again to its current form. See 
ROWLAND H. LoNG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE app. at 39-40 (1992). The writers 
emphasized that intentional injuries were to be excluded from the definition of occurrence by 
placing the exclusionary clause in a separate section entitled "Exclusions." The current language 
provides: 
DEFINITIONS 
5. "occurrence" means an accident, including exposure to conditions, which results, during 
the policy period, in: 
a. bodily injury; or 
b. property damage. 
EXCLUSIONS 
1. ••• Personal Liability •.. do[es] not apply to bodily injury or property damage: 
a. which is expected or intended by the insured; ••.. 
Homeowner's Policy, supra note 9, at 18, 28; see also VAUGHAN, supra note 9, at 731, 741. Thus, 
although the writers changed the format of the intentional injury exception, they retained the 
substance of the exclusion. This Note discusses cases pertaining to both the 1966 and the 1984 
versions but does not distinguish between them. 
Furthermore, courts disagree over whether the words intended and expected as used in inten-
tional injury exclusion clauses are synonymous. Some courts take the view that including both 
words would be redundant if they had the same meaning. See, e.g., Scudder v. Hanover Ins. Co., 
SS9 N.E.2d SS9, S62 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) ("[A] greater degree of proof is required to establish 
intent than expectation."); Badger Mut. Ins. Co. v. Murray, 370 N.E.2d 29S, 299 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1977) (emphasizing that the words expected and intended are not synonymous); Farm Bureau 
Town & Country Ins. Co. v. Turnbo, 740 S.W.2d 232 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (interpreting the word 
expected to mean "reckless" rather than "intentional,'' thereby precluding insurers from having 
to defend actions alleging either "reckless" or "intended" conduct). But see Patrons-Oxford 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 426 A.2d 888 (Me. 1981); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Newcomer, SSS S.W.2d 
28S (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); United Servs. Auto Assn. v. Elitzky, S17 A.2d 982 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1986), appeal denied, S28 A.2d 9S7 (Pa. 1987) (all concluding that the words expected and in-
tended both require the same showing of intentional wrongdoing for the intentional injury exclu-
sion clause to apply). See generally James A. Rigelhaupt, Annotation, Construction and 
Application of Provision of Liability Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding Injuries Intended or 
Expected by Insured, 31 A.L.R. 4th 9S7 (1984 & Supp. 1991). 
A discussion of this disagreement is beyond the scope of this Note. The subsequent analysis 
will assume that the two terms are synonymous. 
2S. Farbstein & Stillman, supra note 19, at 1237; Wilcox, supra note 13, at 1S24-2S. The 
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guage does not attempt to define intent. 26 
In interpreting intent, courts have imported general tort law public 
policy goals to the insurance context. Tort law focuses primarily on 
compensating victims for their injuries while leaving criminal law to 
punish wrongdoers and to deter them and others from behaving simi-
larly in the future. 27 However, tort law addresses both interests in the 
area of intentional torts.28 When wrongdoers commit intentional or 
deliberate acts, many courts allow juries in tort actions to award the 
victim "punitive" or "exemplary" damages. 29 Courts force wrongdo-
ers to pay the victim damages in excess of the amount necessary for 
full compensation in order to further the criminal law policies of pun-
ishment and deterrence. 3° Courts emphasize that in the case of an 
intentional tort, the wrongdoer has thought about his actions and 
made a conscious choice to disregard his victim's interests. The expec-
tation is that financial responsibility for these actions will help to deter 
the wrongdoer from making the same choice in the future. 31 
Courts have addressed the tort law concepts of deterrence and vic-
tim compensation in defining intent when insurers invoke intentional 
injury exclusion clauses to avoid providing coverage for injuries result-
ing from intentional torts. Denying coverage to intentional wrongdo-
ers promotes the public interest in deterrence.32 Consistent with 
revision would seem to deny coverage that would have been available under the pre-1966 stan-
dard. Wilcox points out that some courts view the purpose of the revisions as being "to deny 
indemnification to intentional tortfeasors." Id. at 1525. 
26. Wilcox, supra note 13, at 1528. 
27. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 2, at 7 (5th 
ed. 1984). 
28. Id. § 2, at 9; see also Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851) (emphasizing 
that civil damages can also serve the function of punishing malicious tortfeasors); Tuttle v. Ray-
mond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1355-56, 1361 (Me. 1985) (explaining that civil law and criminal law goals 
merge in cases of deliberate tortious acts). 
29. KEETON ET AL., supra note 27, § 2, at 9; see, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 
111 S. Ct. 1032, 1044 (1991) (upholding jury's discretion to award punitive damages based on 
instructions describing the purpose of punitive damages as " 'not to compensate the plaintiff for 
any injury' but 'to punish the defendant' and 'for the added purpose of protecting the public by 
[deterring] the defendant and others from doing such wrong in the future' " (citation omitted)); 
Wegman v. Pratt, 579 N.E.2d 1035, 1044 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that trial court acted 
inappropriately in striking plaintiff's prayer for punitive damages for injuries arising out of a 
battery because a battery is an intentional tort). See generally 22 AM. JUR. 2o Damages § 733 
(1988). 
30. See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1981) ("Punitive 
damages by definition are not intended to compensate the injured party, but rather to punish the · 
tortfeasor whose wrongful action was intentional or malicious, and to deter him and others from 
similar extreme conduct."); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.11 (1978) (acknowledging that 
punitive damages can be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to deter or punish violations of consti-
tutional rights); see also Bryant v. Silverman, 703 P.2d 1190 (Ariz. 1985) (applying Arizona law 
which allows punitive damages in wrongful death actions to punish and deter). 
31. See, e.g., Coflindaffer v. Coflindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338, 344 (W. Va. 1978) (rejecting inter-
spousal immunity defense based partly on conclusion that allowing abused wives to recover puni-
tive damages from their husbands for intentional assaults "may stay such violence"). 
32. See, e.g., Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 267 A.2d 7, 15 (N.J. 1970) ("The exclusion of 
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intentional tort policy rationales, courts fear that if insureds who com-
mit intentional acts could insure themselves "against the economic 
consequences of [their] wrongdoing, the deterrence attributable to fi-
nancial responsibility would be missing."33 From a financial perspec-
tive, insureds would have a license to engage in wrongful conduct. 34 
But courts are reluctant to deny compensation;35 when wrongdoers 
cannot afford to compensate their victims, insurance may be the vie-
intentional injury from coverage stems from a fear that an individual might be encouraged to 
inflict injury intentionally if he was assured against the dollar consequences."); Long v. Coates, 
806 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Wash. Ct. App.), review denied, 807 P.2d 884 (Wash. 1990) (adopting the 
view taken in Burd). See generally KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 1, § 5.4(d)(l); Cuttler, supra 
note 19, at 157-58; Farbstein & Stillman, supra note 19, at 1245-46. 
33. Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 388 A.2d 603, 606 (N.J. 1978); see also Northwestern 
Natl. Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962), observing: 
Where a person is able to insure himself against punishment he gains a freedom of miscon-
duct inconsistent with the establishment of sanctions against such misconduct. ... [P]ublic 
policy should invalidate any contract of insurance against the civil punishment that punitive 
damages represent. 
The policy considerations in a state where ..• punitive damages are awarded for punish-
ment and deterrence, would seem to require that the damages rest ultimately ... on the 
party actually responsible for the wrong. If that person were permitted to shift the burden 
to an insurance company, punitive damages would serve no useful purpose. Such damages 
do not compensate the plaintiff for his injury, since compensatory damages already have 
made the plaintiff whole. And there is no point in punishing the insurance company; it has 
done no wrong. In actual fact, of course, and considering the extent to which the public is 
insured, the burden would ultimately come to rest not on the insurance companies but on 
the public, since the added liability to the insurance companies would be passed along to the 
premium payers. 
307 F.2d at 440-41. 
34. Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975); Cuttler, supra note 
19, at 157-58; Eric J. Olsson, Appellate Decisions, Insanity: How Does it Affect Liability Insur-
ance Exclusions/or Intentional Torts? Arizona Adopts the Ruvolo Test, 24 ARiz. L. REv. 1046 
(1982); Wilcox, supra note 13, at 1528. 
Allowing indemnification for intentional conduct also contravenes the function of insurance 
policies. Insurance companies protect policyholders against risk of accidental losses by spreading 
the losses over a large number of insureds. Linda J. Kibler, Note, Intentional Injury Exclusion-
ary Clauses: The Question of Ambiguity, 21 VAL. U. L. REv. 361, 362 (1987); Salton, supra note 
12, at 1029-30; see also VAUGHAN, supra note 9, at 29 (identifying four risk characteristics insur-
ers require before offering coverage: (1) a large number of insureds who want to be insured 
against (2) a definite and measurable loss which would be (3) catastrophic and (4) fortuitous). 
Each insured pays a portion of the total expected losses in the form of premiums. Kibler, supra, 
at 362. Insurers calculate premiums based on the assumption that the recurrence of future fortu-
itous losses will approximate the frequency with which similar past losses occurred. VAUGHAN, 
supra note 9, at 29; see also Transamerica Ins. Group v. Meere, 694 P.2d 181, 185-86 (Ariz. 
1984) (discussing the principles behind calculation of insurance premiums). If insureds received 
coverage for intentional losses, they would control the risk of loss, thereby preventing insurers 
from calculating accurate premium rates. VAUGHAN, supra note 9, at 29; see also 1A JOHN A. 
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE§ 4492.01 (Walter F. Berdal ed., 1979); Kibler, 
supra, at 363; Salton, supra note 12, at 1029-30 (all emphasizing that the intentional injury exclu-
sion clause is necessary for insurers to be able to set rates). Moreover, insurers would pass on 
their added liability to all insureds in the form of higher premiums. See, e.g., Northwestern Natl. 
Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440-41 (5th Cir. 1962) (pointing out that requiring 
insurance companies to provide coverage for punitive damages would result in higher premiums 
for all insureds). 
35. See Cuttler, supra note 19, at 158-59; Salton, supra note 12, at 1030-31; Wilcox, supra 
note 13, at 1528. Courts have also recognized this conflicting concern. See, e.g., Burd v. Sussex 
Mut. Ins. Co., 267 A.2d 7, 15 (N.J. 1970). 
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tims' only source of recovery. One technique courts use to reduce the 
likelihood of leaving victims without compensation under the inten-
tional injury exclusion clause is to invoke the contract doctrine of con-
tra proferentum. 36 Under this doctrine, courts construe ambiguous 
insurance policy provisions against the insurer.37 Thus, the insured 
obtains coverage whenever the facts can reasonably be interpreted to 
fall outside the intentional injury exclusion clause. These concerns 
color courts' interpretations of intent. 
B. Traditional Approaches for Determining Intent 
Courts have adopted one of three standards of intent in interpret-
ing intentional injury exclusion clauses; each reflects a determination 
of the relative importance of deterrence and victim compensation. 
This section analyzes the three standards: objective, subjective, and 
inferred intent. It concludes that the inferred-intent standard provides 
the best interpretation of intent under the intentional injury exclusion 
clause because, unlike the other standards, it properly balances the 
competing public policy goals of deterrence and victim compensation. 
A minority of courts, focusing on the deterrence rationale, have 
adopted an objective standard of intent.38 Under this approach, courts 
apply tort law's "reasonable person" test to determine if the insured 
acted with intent. They presume that insureds intend the natural and 
probable consequences of their acts, denying coverage whenever a rea-
sonable insured would have foreseen the injuries resulting from his 
intentional actions. 39 Because courts applying the objective test only 
36. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACI'S § 206 (1981) defines the doctrine: "In choos-
ing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is 
generally preferred which operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a 
writing otherwise proceeds." Courts have frequently cited this principle. See, e.g., State Farm 
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Morgan, 364 S.E.2d 62, 64 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987), ajfd., 368 S.E.2d 509 
(Ga. 1988); Breland v. Schilling, 550 So. 2d 609, 610 (La. 1989); Patrons-Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Dodge, 426 A.2d 888, 891 (Me. 1981); Northwestern Natl. Casualty Co. v. Phalen, 597 P.2d 720, 
724 (Mont. 1979); Ruvolo v. American Casualty Co., 189 A.2d 204, 208 (N.J. 1963). See gener-
ally Salton, supra note 12, at 1031; Wilcox, supra note 13, at 1529 (both discussing the relation· 
ship between this principle of contract interpretation and the public policy of compensating 
injured victims). 
37. Salton, supra note 12, at 1031. Commentators explain that the doctrine of contra profer-
entum is especially applicable to insurance policies because they are adhesion contracts. Their 
terms are usually standardized, providing little opportunity for insureds to bargain. See id.; Wil-
cox, supra note 13, at 1529. The doctrine of plain meaning, under which words should be given 
the meaning an average person would give them, and the doctrine of protecting purchasers' 
reasonable expectations are also used to restrict the scope of the exclusionary clause. Salton, 
supra note 12, at 1031; Wilcox, supra note 13, at 1529-30; see also, e.g., American Family Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 405 N.W.2d 418, 422 (Minn. 1981) (explaining that "policy language is to 
be construed in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the insured •.. and that words 
such as 'intended' are to be given their ordinary meaning" (citation omitted)). 
38. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also Wilcox, supra note 13, at 1534 n.65 
(stating that as of 1986, 10 states had applied the objective test). 
39. See, e.g., JERRY, supra note 1, § 63B[b]; Cuttler, supra note 19, at 161; Wilcox, supra note 
13, at 1534; see also supra note 15 (citing cases applying this approach). Under the objective 
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focus on what a reasonable person would have intended, insureds can-
not escape responsibility for intentional acts by claiming that they did 
not actually intend to cause any harm. 40 For example, the Kansas 
Court of Appeals ignored an insured's claim that, although he inten-
tionally fired a gun at close range, he did not intend to injure his vic-
tim. 41 The injuries were a natural and probable result of the shooting 
and therefore intentional. 42 
By interpreting intent broadly, objective-intent courts put insureds 
on notice that they will bear the financial consequences of all injuries 
foreseeably resulting from their intentional acts whether or not they 
intended any harm. As a result, the objective standard may success-
fully deter insureds from committing harmful acts.43 However, this 
deterrence effect is achieved at the expense of many uncompensated 
victims. 
A second group of courts tries to correct this deficiency by apply-
ing a strict subjective standard of intent. These courts narrowly con-
strue intent to deny coverage only upon a finding that the insured 
actually intended both the act and the precise injury which resulted.44 
The Louisiana Supreme Court recently applied the subjective ap-
proach to allow coverage where an insured punched an opposing soft-
ball team member during an altercation at a game.45 The court 
reasoned that, although the insured intended to hit the plaintiff, he did 
standard, an insured need not subjectively desire to cause any injury. However, it is not clear 
whether the objective tort standard also applies to the act causing the injury or whether the 
insured must subjectively intend the act. One commentator has suggested that "the objective 
standard would apply to the determination of whether the insured intended to do the act from 
which the injury or loss resulted .... " Fischer, supra note 12, at 128 (emphasis added). Never-
theless, courts tend to apply the objective approach only to the resulting injuries. For example, 
in Hins v. Heer, 259 N.W.2d 38, 39-40 (N.D. 1977), the court determined from the facts sur-
rounding the incident that the insured subjectively intended to hit his victim. It then applied the 
objective test to determine whether the injuries were intentional. "Where an intentional act re-
sults in injuries which are the natural and probable consequences of the act, the injuries, as well as 
the act, are intentional." 259 N.W.2d at 40 (emphasis added) (quoting Rankin v. Farmers Eleva-
tor Mut. Ins. Co., 393 F.2d 718, 720 (10th Cir. 1968)); see also Casualty Reciprocal Exch. v. 
Thomas, 647 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982) (applying Rankin's objective test to find the 
victim's injuries intentionally caused, only after determining from the facts of the case that the 
insured subjectively intended to fire a gun at his victim). 
40. See, e.g., Rankin, 393 F.2d at 719-20 (applying objective test to find that an insured who 
intentionally drove his truck into a motorcyclist intended the resulting injuries notwithstanding 
the insured's claims that they were accidental); Hins, 259 N.W.2d at 40 (finding that broken jaw 
resulting from an intentional blow to victim's face was foreseeable regardless of insured's claim 
that he did not actually intend the injuries). 
41. Casualty Reciprocal Exch. v. Thomas, 647 P.2d 1361 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982). 
42. 647 P.2d at 1363-64. 
43. The impact of possible criminal liability on an insured's decision is beyond the scope of 
this Note. See infra note 108. 
44. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. See generally JERRY, supra note 1, § 63B[b]; 
Fischer, supra note 12, at 127-28; Joseph R. Long, II, Note, N.N. v. Moraine Mutual Insurance 
Co.: The Liability Insurance Intentional Injury Exclusion in Cases of Child Sexual Abuse, 1991 
Wis. L. REV. 139, 142; Salton, supra note 12, at 1032-33. 
45. Breland v. Schilling, 550 So. 2d 609 (La. 1989). 
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not subjectively intend to "[cause the] plaintiff any serious harm."46 
From the insured's perspective, "the broken jaw [suffered by the plain-
tifi] was just a 'freak accident.' "47 The court concluded that "when 
minor injury is intended, [but] a substantially greater or more severe 
injury results, whether by chance, coincidence, accident, or whatever, 
[insurance] coverage for the more severe injury is not barred.''48 
Thus, under the subjective test, courts face the problem of deter-
mining exactly what the insured intended at the time he acted.49 For 
example, if an insured drops a rock out of a tenth story window, no 
one but the insured knows whether he wants to see how long it takes 
to land or whether he intends to strike the person below whom it hits. 
Further, even if he intends to hit a pedestrian, he may only intend to 
cause minor injuries rather than the serious skull fracture which re-
sults. The issue, therefore, becomes one of credibility. Insureds who 
can convince a court that they did not intend the resulting harm re-
ceive coverage notwithstanding the fact that a reasonable person 
would have foreseen the risk of the injuries. so 
Because subjective-intent courts require such a precise level of in-
tent before denying coverage, they compensate victims more often 
than objective intent courts do. However, in ensuring victim compen-
sation, they sacrifice deterrence. Threats of financial responsibility are 
unlikely to dissuade insureds in subjective-intent jurisdictions from 
committing intentional tortious acts because they will perceive the risk 
of resulting liability to be very low.st Consequently, neither objective-
nor subjective-intent courts adequately address both deterrence and 
compensation concerns. 
The majority of jurisdictions use a third approach of inferred in-
tent which attempts to strike a balance between victim compensation 
and deterrence.s2 According to this view, an insured must intend both 
the act and some injury.s3 Thus, in contrast to the subjective ap-
46. 550 So. 2d at 614. 
47. 550 So. 2d at 614. 
48. 550 So. 2d at 614; see also Vermont Mut. Ins. v. Dalzell, 218 N.W.2d 52, 55-56 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1974) (granting insurance coverage upon conclusion that although a 17-year-old in-
sured intended to throw a pumpkin over the side of a highway overpass, there was no evidence 
that he intended to injure the motorist passing below). 
49. Under the objective test, see supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text, the insured 
would not receive coverage despite claims of lack of subjective intent to harm. 
50. See Dalzell, 218 N.W.2d at 52. 
51. See infra note 108. 
52. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. See generally JERRY, supra note 1, § 63B[b]; 
Wilcox, supra note 13, at 1531-32. 
53. See, e.g., Butler v. Behaeghe, 548 P.2d 934, 937 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976) (finding that an 
insured intends to cause injury for purposes of the intentional injury exclusion clause if he in-
tends to "cause some harm to the person injured, whether the actual injury inflicted is of the 
same type and degree as that intended or not"); Western Natl. Assurance Co. v. Hecker, 719 
P.2d 954, 960 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) ("[T]he insured must have intended the act and to cause 
some kind of bodily injury."); Pachucki v. Republic Ins. Co., 278 N.W.2d 898, 901 (Wis. 1979) 
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proach, the inferred-intent test does not require the insured to have 
actually intended any harm. 54 Rather, the injury requirement is satis-
fied by imputing to the insured as a matter of law an intent to cause 
injury based on the nature and circumstances of the insured's act. 55 In 
Pachucki v. Republic Insurance Co., 56 the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
inferred an intent to injure when the defendant insureds struck the 
plaintiff in the eye during a "greening pin war."57 Although the de-
fendants insisted that they did not intend to injure the plaintiff in any 
way, testimony revealed not only that obtaining any degree of accu-
racy when shooting greening pins was impossible, but also that one of 
the defendants had suffered an injury causing bleeding during a previ-
ous greening pin fight. 58 Thus, where the act is such that some harm 
is virtually certain to occur, the insured will be deemed to have in-
tended harm even if he actually did not. 59 
Once a court infers that the insured intended to cause some harm, 
it will deem the insured to have also intended the actual injury that 
(pointing out that the inferred intent approach requires the insured to have intended the act and 
some bodily injury); see also JERRY, supra note 1, § 63B[b]; J. Lobrano, Recent Development, 
Breland v. Schilling: The Intentional Act Exclusion Clause in the General Liability Policy -
What Did You Intend?, 6S TuL. L. REv. 443, 44S (1990). 
S4. Many inferred·intent courts appear to require the insured to have actually intended to 
cause some injury. These courts then impute to the insured an intent to cause the extent of the 
resulting harm. For example, in Butler, the Colorado Court of Appeals found that the insured 
actually intended to injure his victim by hitting him in the stomach with a pipe. However, the 
victim ducked and the insured struck him in the head, causing severe injuries. The court inter-
preted the inferred intent standard to apply "if·the insured acts with the intent or expectation 
that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury ... that does result is different either 
in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended." S48 P.2d at 938. Thus, the court 
deemed the insured to have intended to cause the resulting head injuries only after finding that 
the insured subjectively intended to cause his victim some harm. 
Other inferred-intent courts, though, interpret the test not to require the insured to have 
actually intended any harm. These courts infer both an intent to cause some harm and an intent 
to cause the resulting injuries. This Note's discussion focuses on courts that take this approach. 
SS. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Williams, 3SS N.W.2d 421, 424 (Minn. 1984) 
(inferring intent to cause injury as a matter of law where insured inflicted nonconsensual sexual 
acts upon physically disabled adult victim); Jones v. Norval, 279 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Neb. 1979) 
(inferring intent to cause injury as a matter of law where defendant intentionally hit plaintiff in 
the face with his fist); Raby v. Moe, 4SO N.W.2d 4S2, 4S7 (Wis. 1990) (finding that intentional 
participation in armed robbery was so substantially certain to result in some type of bodily injury 
that "the law will infer an intent to injure on behalf of the insured actor''); see also Wilcox, supra 
note 13, at 1S32. 
S6. 278 N.W.2d 898 (Wis. 1979). 
S7. 278 N.W.2d at 899. The court explained that a greening pin war is comparable to shoot-
ing paper clips with rubber bands. 
S8. 278 N.W.2d at 903. 
S9. See, e.g., Clark v. Allstate Ins. Co., S29 P.2d 119S, 1196 (Ariz. Ct. App. 197S) (inferring 
an intent to harm where insured insisted he did not intend to injure the plaintiff despite admitting 
that he intended to strike the victim in the face); Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240, 242-
43 (Ind. Ct. App. 197S) (inferring an intent to injure despite insured's claims that, although he 
intended to strike his neighbor, he did not intend to inflict the resulting injuries); Vascocu v. 
Singletary, 434 So. 2d S97 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (deeming insured to have intended to shoot victim 
in the leg despite insured's insistence that he only intended to shoot the floor to scare the victim). 
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resulted. 60 Courts emphasize that the intentional injury exclusion 
clause applies even if "the bodily injury that does result is different 
either in character or magnitude from the injury that was [inferred to 
be] intended."61 Thus, in Pachucki, it was irrelevant that the eye in-
jury the plaintiff actually suffered was more serious than the type of 
injury the court envisioned as virtually certain to occur.62 
The inferred-intent approach is best viewed as a hybrid standard. 
Courts using this approach apply a narrower objective test to impute 
to the insured a subjective intent to harm based on the nature of the 
insured's act. As under the objective test, an insured under the in-
ferred-intent standard may be deemed to have intended harm he did 
not actually contemplate causing. 63 However, while the objective 
standard applies a broad "natural and probable consequences" test, 
the inferred-intent approach imputes intent to the insured only when 
"an act may be so certain to cause a particular harm that it can be said 
that a person who performed such an act [actually] intended the 
harm."64 Thus, the inferred-intent standard requires an insured's act 
60. See, e.g., Clark, 529 P.2d at 1196 (deeming insured to have intended to crush plaintiff's 
cheekbone after inferring that defendant intended to cause plaintiff some injury by striking plain-
tiff in the face); Butler v. Behaeghe, 548 P.2d 934 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976) (deeming insured to have 
intended to fracture plaintiff's skull after inferring that defendant intended to cause plaintiff 
some harm by intentionally striking plaintiff with a steel pipe); Barton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 527 
So. 2d 524 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (deeming insured to have intended to cause plaintiff's gunshot 
wound after inferring that insured intended to cause plaintiff some injury by intentionally firing a 
gun through the closed bathroom door behind which plaintiff stood). 
61. Butler, 548 P.2d at 938; see also State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Victor, 442 N.W.2d 
880, 883 (Neb. 1989) ("[I]t makes no difference if the actual injury is more severe or ofa different 
nature than the injury intended." (quoting Jones v. Norval, 279 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Neb. 1979))); 
Western Natl. Assurance Co. v. Hecker, 719 P.2d 954, 960 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) ("[O]nce 
intent to cause injury is [inferred], it is immaterial that the actual injury caused is of a different 
character or magnitude than that intended."); Pachucki, 278 N.W.2d at 901 ("[T]he intent to 
injure may be inferred by the nature of the act ... even though the actual injury is different in 
character or magnitude."). See generally JERRY, supra note 1, § 63B[b]. 
62. 278 N.W.2d at 903-04. 
63. Some commentators have focused solely on this similarity and have argued that the in· 
ferred-intent approach applies the same inquiry as the objective test. For example, Olsson, supra 
note 34, at 1047-48, maintains that the inferred-intent test "is an objective one •..• Disregard-
ing the subjective intent of the actor, intent to cause the resulting injuries would be inferred from 
the actual consequences of the act through use of the objective 'natural and probable conse-
quences' test." See also Peter E. Hutchins, The "Intentional Act" Exclusion in New Hampshire 
After MacKinnon v. Hanover Insurance Co., 26 N.H. B.J. 221, 222 (1985) (viewing the inferred-
intent approach as an objective test); Salton, supra note 12, at 1033 n.38 (noting that some com-
mentators view the inferred-intent standard as an objective test). These commentators overlook 
the fact that the inferred-intent standard requires an insured's act to have a much higher 
probability of causing harm than the objective standard does. See infra note 64 and accompany-
ing text. 
Also like the objective standard, the inferred-intent approach prevents insureds from avoiding 
the intentional injury exclusion clause by asserting that they did not intend to inflict the resulting 
serious harm. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the loophole 
present in the subjective test. 
64. Clark, 529 P.2d at 1196 (emphasis added); see also Steinmetz v. National Am. Ins. Co., 
589 P.2d 911, 914 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (quoting Clark, 529 P.2d at 1196); Pachucki v. Republic 
Ins. Co., 278 N.W.2d 898, 903 (Wis. 1979). 
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to have a much higher probability of causing harm than the objective 
standard does. 
For example, assume Mr. M and Ms. N get into a fight. Believing 
no one else to be in the vicinity, Ms. N shoots a gun into the air solely 
to scare Mr. M. However, the bullet injures a third person. A court 
applying the objective test may find the probability of a third party's 
suffering injuries under these circumstances "sufficiently foreseeable" 
to deny Ms. N insurance coverage. However, a court applying the 
inferred-intent standard may not find the probability of a third party's 
suffering injuries as a result of a gun's being fired into the air virtually 
certain and thus will not infer intent by Ms. N to cause harm. 
The inferred-intent standard can also be distinguished from the 
subjective-intent standard. According to the subjective approach, an 
insured must actually intend to cause the precise injury that occurs. 65 
Under the inferred-intent approach, courts only deem the insured to 
have subjectively intended the resulting harm where the nature of the 
act suggests that an injury was so likely to result that the insured must 
have contemplated it. 66 Thus, a remote possibility remains that the 
insured really did not intend to harm the victim. 
The inferred-intent approach finds middle ground between the sub-
jective and objective approaches: actual intent is not required, but re-
sulting injuries must be more certain than "reasonably foreseeable." 
By combining elements of the objective and subjective tests, the in-
ferred-intent approach balances the competing public policy interests 
of deterrence and victim compensation. Consistent with the deter-
rence rationale, an insured will not receive coverage under the in-
ferred-intent approach for an act which he must have known would 
cause injury. 67 Yet victims receive compensation more often under 
this standard than under the "natural and probable consequences" ap-
proach taken by objective intent jurisdictions. The inferred-intent 
standard requires more certainty of causing harm on the part of the 
insured than the objective test does before coverage will be denied. 
Thus, this hybrid standard most effectively addresses these competing 
65. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
66. Some commentators view the inferred intent approach as a second prong of the subjective 
intent standard. See, e.g., Long, supra note 44, at 142 (taking the position that "to infer harmful 
intent •.. is to determine subjectively the actor's actual state of mind"); Wilcox, supra note 13, at 
1531-33 ("The majority of courts apply a two-prong specific intent standard to insurance poli-
cies .•.• Even under the [second prong], in which a court infers intent from the egregious nature 
of the event, the focus is on the policyholder's desire as evidenced by the context of her acts."). 
These characterizations, though, ignore the fact that the inferred intent approach only imputes to 
the insured a subjective desire to cause harm. An insured who is found to have intended harm 
under the inferred intent approach may not have actually intended to cause the resulting injury 
at the time he acted. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
67. See, e.g., Barton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 527 So. 2d 524 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 532 So. 
2d 157 (La. 1988); Pachucki, 278 N.W.2d at 898 (discussed supra notes 56-58 and accompanying 
text). 
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public policy concerns for purposes of the intentional injury exclusion 
clause. 
II. THE VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION DEFENSE 
Courts face a complication in interpreting the intentional injury 
exclusion clause when an insured commits an apparently intentional 
act while voluntarily intoxicated. Suppose Mr. X gets drunk while 
hosting a party at his home and starts an argument with Ms. Y. Mr. 
X becomes enraged and pulls out a gun. He threatens to shoot Ms. Y 
if she does not leave. A third person tries to reason with Mr. X. Mr. 
X refuses to listen and insists that there is only one way for him to 
avoid ever seeing Ms. Y again. He then shoots her. 
Under any of the three intent standards examined in Part I, Mr. X 
would be denied coverage if he were not drunk. Under the objective 
approach, injuries suffered by Ms. Y would be characterized as inten-
tional because they are the natural and probable result of being shot at 
close range.68 Because Mr. X verbally expressed his intention to shoot 
Ms. Y in order to avoid ever seeing her again, courts applying the 
subjective approach would also deny coverage.69 Finally, intent can be 
inferred because Mr. X must have been aware that shooting Ms. Y at 
close range would cause injury.70 
However, because Mr. X was intoxicated, courts must decide 
whether to allow a civil defense for voluntary intoxication. They try 
to fit their decisions into the framework developed in Part I. For ex-
ample, a number of inferred intent jurisdictions try to maintain the 
balance between victim compensation and deterrence by rejecting a 
voluntary intoxication defense and holding Mr. X to the same stan-
dard of intent as if he had shot Ms. Y while sober. 71 
The majority of courts admit evidence of intoxication to decide 
whether the insured possessed the mental capacity to form the re-
quired intent to act. 72 If a court concludes that the insured lacked the 
68. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text. 
69. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text. Courts applying the subjective test must 
determine what the insured actually intended. Thus, coverage will usually turn on whether the 
insured verbally expressed his intent as Mr. X did. 
70. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text. The Louisiana Court of Appeals applied 
this reasoning in Barton, 527 So. 2d at 524, to deny coverage to an insured who must have been 
aware that shooting a gun through a bathroom door would injure the person behind it. 
71. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sherrill, 566 F. Supp. 1286 (E.D. Mich. 1983), ajfd., 135 
F.2d 1363 (6th Cir. 1984); Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Kerwin, 576 N.E.2d 94 
(Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 133 (Ill. 1991); Economy Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. 
Meyer, 427 N.W.2d 742 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cole, 631S.W.2d661 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1982) (all holding that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to the intentional injury 
exclusion clause). 
72. See, e.g., Parkinson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1039 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979); State Fann 
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Morgan, 364 S.E.2d 62 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987), ajfd., 368 S.E.2d 509 (Ga. 
1988); MacKinnon v. Hanover Ins. Co., 471 A.2d 1166 (N.H. 1974); Safeco Ins. Co. v. House, 
721 P.2d 862 (Or. Ct. App.), review denied, 726 P.2d 1185 (Or. 1986); N.N. v. Moraine Mut. Ins. 
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capacity to intend his act, it allows a voluntary intoxication defense to 
the intentional injury exclusion clause, and the insurer must provide 
coverage.73 Conversely, in situations where a court finds that the in-
sured had sufficient capacity to form the intent to act despite intoxica-
tion, it denies the defense and applies its usual intent standard to 
decide whether the resulting injuries were intended. 74 Because the de-
fense is more likely to succeed as an insured's level of intoxication 
rises, it promotes victim compensation at the expense of deterring in-
sureds from drinking to the point where they lose control and cause 
harm. Despite this result, even courts favoring the deterrence ration-
ale examine evidence of intoxication in considering intent. 75 Accord-
ingly, these courts promote deterrence only when they deny the 
defense. 76 Thus, by trying to fit the current defense within traditional 
intent standards, objective-intent courts fail to address the policy con-
cern most important to them, and inferred-intent courts upset the op-
timal balance between victim compensation and deterrence. 
This Part analyzes how a court's choice of an intent standard influ-
ences its decision to allow a voluntary intoxication defense to the in-
tentional injury exclusion clause. Section II.A discusses the rationale 
behind the decisions of some inferred-intent courts not to allow a vol-
untary intoxication defense. Section II.B sets out the two-step intent 
analysis followed by the majority of courts under which they admit 
evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate intent. The section then 
examines why the voluntary intoxication defense promotes victim 
compensation at the expense of deterrence. Part II concludes that 
only modifying the current voluntary intoxication defense will ade-
quately address both these interests. 
A. The Minority View: Courts That Refuse To Allow a Voluntary 
Intoxication Defense 
Outside the area of voluntary intoxication, courts that want to ad-
Co., 434 N.W.2d 845 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (all admitting evidence of voluntary intoxication to 
negate the intent required under the intentional injury exclusion clause). 
73. See, e.g., Nettles v. Evans, 303 So. 2d 306 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. 
Co., 267 A.2d 7 (N.J. 1970); Long v. Coates, 806 P.2d 1256 (Wash. Ct. App.), review denied, 807 
P.2d 884 (Wash. 1990) (all concluding, based on evidence of insured's level of intoxication, that 
insured lacked the mental capacity to form the required intent when he acted). 
74. See, e.g., Lawler Mach. & Foundry Co. v. Pacific Indem. Ins. Co., 383 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 
1980) (applying objective approach and concluding that injuries were natural and probable con-
sequence of insured driving his truck through a restaurant); Parkinson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 594 
P.2d 1039 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (applying inferred intent approach to find that insured intended 
to shoot victim notwithstanding the fact that insured was intoxicated); Kenna v. Griffin, 481 
P.2d 450 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (applying inferred intent approach to find that intoxicated in-
sured intended to commit a battery). 
75. See, e.g., Lawler, 383 So. 2d at 156 (applying objective test upon concluding that despite 
intoxication, defendant intended to drive his truck through the wall of a restaurant). 
76. See infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text. 
2128 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:2113 
dress both deterrence and victim compensation concerns choose the 
inferred-intent standard. 77 A minority of these jurisdictions78 try to 
maintain the balance between deterrence and victim compensation79 in 
cases of harm caused by intoxicated insureds. They hold intoxicated 
insureds to the same standard of intent as any other insured, 80 empha-
sizing that the law should not permit insureds to use alcohol as a way 
to escape financial liability for "otherwise intentional" actions - ac-
tions that would be intentional but for the wrongdoer's intoxicated 
state. 81 As an illustration, the Illinois Court of Appeals recently re-
jected the intoxication defense where a drunk insured shot his victim 
during an altercation in a tavern parking lot. 82 "[I]t would be against 
[the] public policy [of deterring wrongful conduct] to relieve citizens 
of the consequences of their acts based upon their voluntary intoxica-
tion."83 The court concluded that the insured was not entitled to cov-
erage because, but for the insured's intoxication, his actions would be 
deemed intentional under the inferred intent standard. 84 Thus, 
although courts rejecting the defense appear to focus on deterrence, 
they address victim compensation by requiring the insured to possess 
the inferred-intent standard's high level of intent before denying 
coverage. 85 
77. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text. 
78. See, e.g., Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Kerwin, 576 N.E.2d 94 (Ill. App. 
Ct.), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 133 (Ill. 1991); Economy Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 427 
N.W.2d 742 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cole, 631 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1982); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Newcomer, 585 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). As explained infra 
notes 80-85 and accompanying text, these courts have attempted to maintain the balance be-
tween victim compensation and deterrence by rejecting the voluntary intoxication defense in the 
insurance context. 
79. See infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
80. The author's research has not revealed any subjective- or objective-intent jurisdictions 
that take this view. In fact, one objective-intent court partly rationalized its decision to admit 
evidence of voluntary intoxication by pointing out that only inferred-intent jurisdictions have 
rejected the defense: 
[I]n each case [rejecting the defense,] the court had adopted a rule that from certain acts 
intent should be inferred as a matter of law. Against this legally required inference, the 
courts held intoxication unavailing. In the present case, we ••• have adopted the different 
standard of intent or expectation in fact. The cases cited are, therefore, not on point. 
MacKinnon v. Hanover Ins. Co., 471A.2d1166, 1168-69 (N.H. 1984). 
81. See, e.g., Newcomer, 585 S.W.2d at 289 ("[T]he law must not permit the use of ••• 
stimuli [such as alcohol] to become a defense for one's actions."); see also American Family Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 405 N.W.2d 418, 422 (Minn. 1987); Cole, 631 S.W.2d at 664 (both adopting 
the Hanover court's reasoning). 
82. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Kerwin, 576 N.E.2d at 94. 
83. 576 N.E.2d at 97. 
84. 576 N.E.2d at 97. 
85. For example, in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sherrill, 566 F. Supp. 1286, 1288 (E.D. Mich. 1983), 
ajfd., 735 F.2d 1363 (6th Cir. 1984), the court rejected the voluntary intoxication defense, rea-
soning that "public policy demands that a voluntary departure of one's good judgment and ra-
tional decision-making abilities should not permit the insured to abrogate his financial 
responsibility to those he brutally injures." The court also addressed the victim compensation 
concern by applying the inferred intent standard. See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hampton, 433 
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These courts implicitly assume that all people can control their 
intake of alcohol. Consequently, they believe that prohibiting the de-
fense will deter people from consuming alcohol to the point where 
they lose control and harm someone. Although this approach may 
successfully deter nonalcoholics - those people who can control the 
quantity of alcohol they consume - from drinking to the point of 
causing harm, it may have no effect on alcoholics. 86 Studies show that 
threats of financial liability do not cause alcohol abusers to alter their 
drinking patterns. 87 Treatment may be the only solution. 88 
Courts who reject the defense and deny coverage disregard the 
questionable utility of using liability to prevent alcoholics from repeat-
edly engaging in destructive behavior. In American Family Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Peterson, 89 the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to 
grant an intoxication defense where a drunken insured struck his girl-
friend's landlady on the head with a hammer "for no apparent rea-
son. "90 Testimony revealed that the insured was a confirmed alcoholic 
who attacked the landlady during an alcoholic blackout.91 The Peter-
son court, though, ignored this fact and focused only on the impor-
tance of not "creat[ing] a situation where the more drunk an insured 
can prove himself to be, the more likely he will have insurance cover-
age. "92 Therefore, courts that completely reject the voluntary intoxi-
cation defense do not adequately address both deterrence and victim 
compensation in all cases. 
B. The Majority View: Courts That Admit Evidence of Voluntary 
Intoxication 
The majority of courts allow insureds to support with evidence a 
plea of voluntary intoxication offered as a defense to the intentional 
injury exclusion clause.93 This section examines the two-step test that 
N.W.2d 334, 336 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (rejecting the voluntary intoxication defense under the 
Sherrill court's reasoning and denying the defendant insured coverage pursuant to the inferred 
intent approach). ' 
86. See infra note 182 for the definition of the term alcoholic. 
87. See infra note 194 and accompanying text. But see also infra notes 189-92 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the counterarguments made by some experts). 
88. This Note assumes that alcoholics become voluntarily intoxicated when they consume 
alcohol. Although alcoholics cannot control their current intake of alcohol, they voluntarily 
chose to start drinking excessively, see infra note 184 and accompanying text, and they can 
choose to stop drinking by seeking treatment. See infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text. 
89. 405 N.W.2d 418 (Minn. 1987). 
90. 405 N.W.2d at 419. 
91. 405 N.W.2d at 420. The Peterson court explained that alcoholics retain no memory of 
what occurred when they suffer blackouts. 
92. 405 N.W.2d at 422. 
93. See Fischer, supra note 12, at 146 (indicating that admitting evidence of voluntary intoxi-
cation to negate intent is the majority view). The author's research indicates that all courts 
applying the strict subjective approach or the objective approach as well as some of the inferred 
intent jurisdictions admit evidence of volunt;try intoxication to negate intent. 
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these courts apply in determining whether an insured possessed suffi-
cient intent to act and cause harm. First, regardless of the intent stan-
dard they usually apply, courts determine whether an insured 
subjectively possessed the mental capacity to intend his act. Courts 
then pursue one of two possible courses depending on the conclusion 
reached under step one. If the insured's intoxication destroyed his 
ability to form the required intent to act, a court will grant the insured 
coverage and end the inquiry. Conversely, if a court concludes that an 
insured possessed the capacity to intend his act, despite his intoxicated 
state, it will apply traditional intent standards to determine whether 
the insured intended the resulting injuries. This section concludes, in 
the context of this majority framework, that the current voluntary in-
toxication defense is inadequate because it promotes victim compensa-
tion at the expense of deterrence. 
1. Step One: Examine Evidence of Voluntary Intoxication 
All courts recognizing a voluntary intoxication defense to the in-
tentional injury exclusion clause initially determine whether alcohol 
destroyed an insured's mental capacity to form the required intent to 
act. 94 In doing so, courts examine all evidence regarding the effects of 
alcohol on the insured's state of mind at the time he acted. In Long v. 
Coates, 95 the Washington Court of Appeals concluded on the basis of 
expert testimony that an intoxicated insured who stabbed an off-duty 
police officer in the back did not possess sufficient intent to implicate 
the intentional injury exclusion clause. Evidence showed that the in-
sured's "blood alcohol level was about .24% at the time of the stab-
bing and he was severely intoxicated. "96 A psychiatrist opined that 
"individuals with blood alcohol levels well above .1 % will be so im-
paired they are unable to form an intent."97 Based on these state-
ments, the court concluded that the insured's level of intoxication 
sufficiently prevented him from forming the required intent, and it up-
held coverage. 98 
Similarly, the Louisiana Court of Appeals, in Nettles v. Evans, 99 
considered all available information in determining that an intoxicated 
insured who attacked a woman in a parking lot did not possess suffi-
94. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Morgan, 364 S.E.2d 62 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987), 
ajfd., 368 S.E.2d 509 (Ga. 1988); Lawrence v, Moore, 362 So. 2d 803 (La. Ct. App.), writ 
granted, 365 So. 2d 230 (La. 1978), appeal dismissed, 368 So. 2d 121 (La. 1979); MacKinnon v. 
Hanover Ins. Co., 471 A.2d 1166 (N.H. 1986); Safeco Ins. Co. v. House, 721 P.2d 862 (Or. Ct. 
App.), review denied, 726 P.2d 1185 (Or. 1986) (all recognizing a voluntary intoxication defense 
and therefore considering evidence of the insured's mental capacity to form the required intent). 
95. 806 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990), review denied, 807 P.2d 884 (Wash. 1991). 
96. 806 P.2d at 1259. 
97. 806 P.2d at 1259. 
98. 806 P.2d at 1260. 
99. 303 So. 2d 306 (La. Ct. App. 1974). 
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cient intent under the intentional injury exclusion clause. It consid-
ered eyewitness testimony, expert testimony concerning the effects of 
the drugs and alcohol the insured had ingested prior to the incident, 
and the insured's testimony regarding his state of mind at the time he 
acted. 100 The court emphasized the importance of considering the in-
sured's own testimony to determine his actual state of mind: "[W]e 
have [the insured's] description of a hallucination at the time of the 
incident, which, although self-serving is consistent with the expert's 
opinion as to what reactions could be expected under the 
circumstances." 101 
Thus, courts considering evidence of voluntary intoxication rely 
not only on expert testimony but also on the insured's own recollec-
tion. A court's conclusion regarding the credibility of the insured's 
story may determine whether the court holds the insured financially 
responsible for his act. The next subsection examines the conse-
quences of this conclusion. 
2. Step Two: Decide Whether To Grant the Voluntary 
Intoxication Defense 
After examining evidence of voluntary intoxication, courts follow 
one of two possible analyses. A court may either conclude that the 
insured's intoxication destroyed his capacity to form the required in-
tent to act and thus grant the insured coverage or, conversely, may 
conclude that an insured intended his act despite his intoxicated state 
and apply its traditional intent standard to determine whether the in-
sured intended the resulting injuries. This subsection examines these 
two possibilities. It concludes that the current voluntary intoxication 
defense must be modified to accommodate adequately both victim 
compensation and deterrence policy concerns. 
a. The consequences of a court's determination that intoxication 
destroyed intent. If a court concludes that the insured's intoxication 
destroyed his ability to form the required intent to act, the court in-
vokes the voluntary intoxication defense to grant the insured coverage 
for the economic consequences of his wrongdoing. However, rather 
than trying to balance the competing policy concerns of deterrence 
and victim compensation, the current defense promotes victim com-
pensation at the expense of deterrence. The more drunk an insured 
becomes, the more likely he is to receive coverage.102 The coverage in 
tum goes toward compensating the insured's victims for their injuries. 
To illustrate, suppose instead of suddenly getting mad at Ms. Y at 
100. 303 So. 2d at 307-09. 
101. 303 So. 2d at 309. 
102. See, e.g., Olsson, supra note 34, at 1053-55 (acknowledging that the voluntary intoxica-
tion defense promotes victim compensation to the exclusion of deterrence). 
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a party, Mr. X has been building up hatred for Ms. Y for months. He 
decides the only way to get her out of his mind is to kill her. If Mr. X 
invites Ms. Y to his home and shoots her while he is sober, he will 
certainly be denied coverage under any interpretation of the inten-
tional injury exclusion clause.103 The clause was designed specifically 
to prevent people like Mr. X from avoiding financial responsibility for 
planned incidents.104 
However, if Mr. X were more devious, he could take advantage of 
the voluntary intoxication defense loophole and receive coverage by 
getting drunk before carrying out his plan.105 Expert testimony only 
reveals an insured's blood alcohol level and the medically known ef-
fects of that amount of alcohol on a person's mental capacity. From 
that evidence, Mr. X could appear to have been just as impaired as the 
insured in Long v. Coates. 106 The court's ultimate decision, assuming 
there were no witnesses to Mr. X's plan, will necessarily tum on the 
credibility of Mr. X's own testimony concerning his mental state. If 
Mr. X can convince a court that he did not know what he was doing 
when he shot Ms. Y, as the insured was able to do in Nettles v. Ev-
ans, 107 he will receive coverage. Thus, the current version of the vol-
untary intoxication defense allows insureds to drink away financial 
responsibility for their intentional wrongdoing. 108 
b. The consequences of a court's determination that intoxication 
did not destroy intent. If a court concludes that the insured intended 
103. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. 
104. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. 
105. At least one court has stated that "it is not obvious that a refusal to consider relevant 
evidence of intoxication on the issue of actual intent would have any appreciable effect on the 
behavior of insured persons." MacK.innon v. Hanover Ins. Co., 471 A.2d 1166, 1169 (N.H. 
1984). However, the MacKinnon court offered no objective proof for this conclusion. The court 
simply assumed that insureds will not take advantage of the fact that they can receive coverage 
for otherwise intentional wrongdoing simply by consuming alcohol beforehand. But see infra 
note 115 and accompanying text'. 
106. 806 P.2d 1256 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990), review denied, 807 P.2d 884 (Wash. 1991) (dis-
cussed supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text). 
107. 303 So. 2d 306 (La. Ct. App. 1974) (discussed supra notes 99-101 and accompanying 
text). 
108. Intentional torts that implicate the intentional injury exclusion clause usually also con-
stitute criminal acts. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Abraio, 874 F.2d 619, 622-23 
(9th Cir. 1989) (finding that sexual molestation constituted both an intentional tort in a civil 
damage action and a criminal act); Wegman v. Prat, 579 N.E.2d 1035, 1044 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) 
(indicating that a battery constituted both an intentional tort for civil purposes and a criminal 
act); Kemp v. Kemp, 723 S.W.2d 138 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (assault and battery committed 
upon spouse constituted both an intentional tort entitling victim to damages and a crime entitling 
victim to press criminal charges). Therefore, people like Mr. X risk both financial and criminal 
liability in deciding to commit an intentional act. The deterrent effect of possible criminal liabil-
ity on Mr. X's decision is beyond the scope of this Note. However, most states admit evidence of 
voluntary intoxication to negate specific intent to commit criminal acts. PETER W. Low, CRIMI· 
NAL LAW 139 (1984). Accordingly, Mr. X may believe that getting drunk before committing an 
intentional act will allow him to escape all liability. A court's ability to detect people like Mr. X 
in the criminal context is also beyond the scope of this Note. 
June 1992] Note - Voluntary Intoxication 2133 
his act despite his intoxicated state, it will deny a voluntary intoxica-
tion defense to the insured and apply its traditional intent standard to 
determine whether the insured intended the resulting injuries. Follow-
ing this analysis, the Louisiana Court of Appeals applied a subjective-
intent test after denying an intoxication defense to an insured who ad-
mitted in his deposition that he intended to hit the plaintiff even 
though he was intoxicated.109 The court held that the insured was not 
entitled to coverage under the subjective standard because he admitted 
to intending the actual harm which occurred. 110 Similarly, in Lawler 
Machinery & Foundry Co. v. Pacific Indemnity Insurance Co., 111 the 
Alabama Supreme Court applied an objective-intent test upon con-
cluding that the defendant insured intended to drive his truck through 
the wall of a restaurant notwithstanding the fact that he was intoxi-
cated. The court denied the insured coverage under the objective test, 
reasoning that the resulting injuries were the natural and probable 
consequence of the insured's act.112 
Courts that deny the voluntary intoxication defense to nonalco-
holic insureds implicitly acknowledge the importance of deterrence. 
These courts send a signal to drinkers that they cannot use alcohol to 
shield their decisions to commit harmful acts. For example, the 
Lawler court denied the defendant the defense notwithstanding evi-
dence that he had been "drinking beer throughout the day and eve-
ning, [and] was seen to stagger in the restaurant." 113 The rationale is 
that potential liability may dissuade some individuals from starting to 
drink excessively114 or from intentionally consuming alcohol to the 
point where they lose control and cause harm. 115 Moreover, insureds 
109. Lawrence v. Moore, 362 So. 2d 803, 804 (La. Ct. App.), writ granted, 365 So. 2d 230 
(La. 1978), appeal dismissed, 368 So. 2d 121 (La. 1979). 
110. 362 So. 2d at 805. The court was able to find subjective intent here in contrast to 
Vermont Mut. Ins. v. Dalzell, 218 N.W.2d 52 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974) (discussed supra note 48), 
only because the insured admitted to intending the actual injuries which occurred. 
111. 383 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1980). 
112. 383 So. 2d at 158. 
113. 383 So. 2d at 156. 
114. See infra note 193 and accompanying text. 
115. Several studies have revealed evidence that people do consume alcohol in order to es-
cape liability for otherwise intentional acts. For example, Dwight B. Heath, Alcohol and Aggres-
sion: A ''Missing Link" in Worldwide Perspective, in ALCOHOL, DRUG ABUSE AND AGGRESSION 
89 (Edward Gottheil et al. eds., 1983), notes: 
[A] wide variety of ethnographic accounts reinforce the anecdotal findings of police psychol-
ogists, psychiatrists, and others in our own society, to the effect that individuals ... often 
admit to planning some asocial or antisocial act and then drinking - not so much to muster 
their courage as to "have an excuse." ... [I]n our own society, even the most severe critics 
of alcohol accept the estimate that no more than 10 percent of drinkers have alcohol-related 
problems . . . . This means that at least 90 percent of drinkers in this country seem to feel 
that alcohol lets them do what they want to do. 
Id. at 100. Thus, alcohol has become a license to harm. 
ROBERT R. Ross & LYNN 0. LIGHTFOOT, THE TREATMENT OF THE ALCOHOL-ABUSING 
OFFENDER 14 (1985), point out that some people consume alcohol to provide them with "an 
excuse to behave in an antisocial manner." They cite a study in which abusive husbands were 
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like Mr. X, who actually retain control when acting, will not be able to 
rely on apparent intoxication to avoid financial responsibility for in-
tentional tortious acts. 116 Of these courts, those that deny the defense 
and then apply the subjective- or inferred-intent approaches to deter-
mine whether the insured intended the resulting injuries also address 
the interest in compensating victims. 117 
Denying the voluntary intoxication defense to alcoholics as a class 
may not deter them for the same reasons that fully rejecting the de-
fense may not. 118 Consequently, courts sacrifice deterrence not only 
when they grant the current voluntary intoxication defense, t 19 but also 
when they deny the defense to alcoholics. 120 The next Part proposes a 
modification to the defense to account better for both deterrence and 
victim compensation in all situations. 
III. SUBROGATION AND COERCIVE ALCOHOL TREATMENT: 
ALTERNATIVES TO THE CURRENT VOLUNTARY 
INTOXICATION DEFENSE 
The current voluntary intoxication defense to intentional injury ex-
clusion clauses promotes victim compensation at the expense of deter-
rence. Insureds who become so drunk that they cannot form the 
required intent escape financial responsibility for their acts. Thus, the 
defense condones excessive drinking when over ten million Americans 
suffer from alcohol abuse. 121 Secondary costs of alcohol are stunning 
as well. Alcohol is involved in approximately fifty percent of all ar-
found to use alcohol as a scapegoat for their desire to beat their wives. Id; see also Richard H. 
Blum, Violence, Alcohol, and Setting: An Unexplored Nexus, in DRINKING AND CRIME: PER· 
SPECTIVES ON THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION AND CRIMINAL BE· 
HAVIOR 110, 133 (James J. Collings, Jr. ed., 1981) (arguing that people use alcohol as a 
justification to carry out antisocial plans); Robert G. Niven, Alcohol and the Family, in ALCO· 
HOLISM AND RELATED PROBLEMS: ISSUES FOR THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 91, 107 (1984) [herein-
after ALCOHOLISM AND RELATED PROBLEMS] ("[l]t has been suggested that alcohol is used as 
an excuse for violent behavior .•• in an attempt to escape legal punishment for violent acts."). 
Because intentional torts usually constitute crimes, see supra note 108, individuals in the above 
studies may drink to escape both financial and criminal liability. 
116. See supra note 108. 
117. But see infra note 120. When courts grant the defense, they emphasize victim compen· 
sation at the expense of deterrence. However, objective-intent courts that deny the defense do 
the opposite. Courts justify decisions to hold intoxicated insureds responsible for their acts on 
the ground that doing so will prevent insureds from using alcohol as an excuse to harm others in 
the future. Because the objective test focuses on deterrence, courts that apply it to the resulting 
injuries sacrifice the victim's interest in compensation. 
118. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88. 
119. See supra text accompanying notes 102-108. 
120. Although subjective- and inferred-intent courts that deny the defense acknowledge the 
importance of compensating victims, see supra note 117 and accompanying text, denial of the 
defense usually results in denial of insurance coverage for the victim. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 109-12. This problem similarly arises when courts deny the defense to alcoholics. 
121. ALLAN LuKS, WILL AMERICA SOBER UP? 13 (1983); Leonard Saxe et al., The Effec-
tiveness and Cost of Alcoholism Treatment: A Public Policy Perspective, in THE DIAGNOSIS AND 
TREATMENT OF ALCOHOLISM 485, 487 (Jack H. Mendelson & Nancy K. Mello eds., 2d ed. 
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rests;122 additionally, eighty percent of homicides, seventy percent of 
serious assaults, and seventy-two percent of robberies annually may be 
the products of intoxication.123 One means of reducing the current 
alcohol problem in the United States, and the injuries that result, is to 
modify the voluntary intoxication defense in the insurance context 
through state legislation. 
This Note proposes legislation which draws on the approaches 
taken both by courts who currently reject the voluntary intoxication 
defense and by courts who currently examine evidence of intoxication 
to determine whether to grant the defense to individual insureds. All 
courts would initially follow the approach taken by courts who reject 
the defense, i.e., apply the inferred-intent standard to determine 
whether the insured committed an otherwise intentional act. Doing so 
would ensure that courts strike an initial balance between victim com-
pensation and deterrence124 which they could then maintain by apply-
ing the proposed modifications to the voluntary intoxication defense. 
Also, courts would avoid the problem of deciding whether particular 
insureds such as Mr. X intended their acts despite their intoxicated 
state. 
Courts that concluded a tortfeasor would have intended the action 
either but for or in spite of the influence of alcohol would then invoke 
a modified voluntary intoxication defense. The modified defense 
would require insurers to provide coverage for all victims injured by 
insureds who act while voluntarily intoxicated subject to an insurer 
right of reimbursement against those insureds who committed other-
wise intentional acts. This aspect of the defense would ensure that all 
victims receive compensation while deterring nonalcoholic wrongdo-
ers from consuming alcohol to the point where they would lose control 
and cause harm. However, because treatment may be the only means 
of deterring alcoholic insureds from drinking and committing inten-
tional torts, the defense would allow the diagnosed alcoholic to avoid 
reimbursing the insurer if he successfully completed an alcohol treat-
ment program. Rather than allowing alcohol abusers to avoid the fi-
1985); see also GARY G. FORREST, GUIDELINES FOR RESPONSIBLE DRINKING 22 (1989) (esti-
mating that 13 million Americans suffer from alcoholism). 
122. Louis J. West, Alcoholism and Related Problems: An Overview, in ALCOHOLISM AND 
RELATED PROBLEMS, supra note 115, at 1, 13; see also Saxe, supra note 121, at 487 (estimating 
that alcohol is implicated in 50% of all homicides and automobile accidents and 25% of all 
suicides). 
123. West, supra note 122, at 13; Stewart G. Wolf, Alcohol and Health: The Wages of Exces-
sive Drinking. in ALCOHOLISM AND RELATED PROBLEMS, supra note 115, at 27, 35. See gener-
ally JAMES J. CoLLINS, NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ALCOHOL USE 
AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 2-4 (1981); John Kaplan, Alcohol, Law Enforcement, and Criminal 
Justice, in ALCOHOLISM AND RELATED PROBLEMS, supra note 115, at 78, 79-82 (both discuss-
ing studies done on the correlation between intoxication and crime). 
124. See supra section I.B. 
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nancial consequences of their wrongdoing, the modified defense would 
force them to get help. 
This Part analyzes this proposal. Section III.A examines courts' 
traditional reluctance to allow insurers to bring subrogation actions 
against their own insureds. It then argues that the prohibition is inap-
propriate in cases involving intentional injuries. Section 111.B consid-
ers the proposal that an exception to the general prohibition be 
extended to voluntarily intoxicated insureds who commit otherwise in-
tentional acts. It argues that although subrogation would effectively 
deter nonalcoholics from consuming alcohol in order to take advan-
tage of the intoxication loophole in the intentional injury exclusion 
clause, it would not adequately deter alcoholics from committing in-
tentional acts. Section III.B therefore concludes that subrogation 
alone is not a sufficient solution to the defects in the current voluntary 
intoxication defense. Section 111.C examines the second aspect of the 
modified defense that insurer subrogation rights be subject to an ex-
ception for alcoholic insureds who successfully complete alcohol reha-
bilitation programs. The section analyzes the success of current state 
statutes that mandate alcohol treatment and concludes that analogous 
legislation in the insurance context would effectively address the pub-
lic interest in deterring alcoholic intentional wrongdoers that is ig-
nored under the current voluntary intoxication defense. 
A. The Traditional Rule: Insurers Cannot Maintain Subrogation 
Actions Against Their Insureds 
Subrogation allows an insurer who pays a loss covered by its in-
sured's policy to recover the amount paid from the person whose tor-
tious act caused the loss. 125 The doctrine thus ensures that the 
wrongdoer does not escape financial responsibility. 126 "Subrogation is 
intended to work justice, and a just result is having the loss fall ulti-
mately on the party legally responsible for it."127 
There are two types of subrogation. "Equitable subrogation" is an 
equitable doctrine that arises by operation of law rather than by con-
tract.128 Principles of equity require that the party primarily liable for 
125. See generally 6A APPLEMAN, supra note 34, § 4051; RONALD c. HORN, SUBROGATION 
IN INSURANCE THEORY AND PRACTICE 3-6, 11-14 (1964); JERRY, supra note I, §§ 96(a]-[c]. 
126. SB APPLEMAN, supra note 34, § 4941; HORN, supra note 125, at 12; JERRY, supra note 
l, § 96[a]; see also A. & B. Auto Stores v. Newark, 279 A.2d 693 (N.J. 1971); Hartford Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Advocate, 560 N.Y.S.2d 331, 335 (App. Div. 1990), appeal granted, 569 N.E.2d 1026 
(N.Y.), order revd., 581 N.E.2d 1335 (N.Y. 1991) (both pointing out that subrogation places 
responsibility on the wrongdoer). 
127. JERRY, supra note 1, § 96(c]; see also HORN, supra note 125, at 3 ("(O]ur society feels 
that, in equity and good conscience, debt should be ultimately discharged by the party(ies) pri-
marily responsible ...• "). 
128. See. e.g., Farr Man & Co. v. M/V Rozita, 903 F.2d 871, 877 (1st Cir. 1990); Stalford 
Metal Works, Inc. v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 418 F. Supp. 56, 58 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Ambas-
sador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 388 A.2d 603, 607 (N.J. 1978) (all citing the definition of equitable 
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the loss pay even though the parties have not expressly provided for 
it. 129 In contrast, "conventional subrogation" occurs when parties 
provide for subrogation rights by contract.130 In those situations, sub-
rogation is governed by the agreed-upon terms131 regardless of 
whether equity would allow it. 
Traditionally, absent "clear and unequivocal language" to the con-
trary, 132 insurers cannot maintain subrogation actions against their in-
sureds.133 This section explains the rationale behind the rule and then 
analyzes the recent willingness of some courts to make exceptions for 
intentional injuries. It concludes that the reasoning used by these 
courts should be extended to grant insurers a right of reimbursement 
against voluntarily intoxicated insureds who commit intentional acts. 
1. The Traditional Rule 
Courts emphasize several reasons why insurers cannot maintain 
subrogation actions against their insureds.134 First, insurer subroga-
subrogation); see also Bruce B. Zager, Note, Conflicts Regarding the "No Subrogation Against 
Insured" Rule, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 811, 814 (1979-80). See generally JERRY, supra note I, 
§ 96[b]. 
129. New York Bd. of Fire Underwriters v. Trans Urban Constr. Co., 458 N.Y.S.2d 216 
(App. Div.), order ajfd., 458 N.E.2d 1255 (N.Y. 1983); JERRY, supra note 1, § 96[b]. Insurers 
wishing to invoke this type of subrogation must satisfy four requirements. First, the party seek-
ing subrogation must have already paid the debt. Second, the party seeking subrogation must 
have paid the debt under legal compulsion. Third, the party claiming subrogation must be secon-
darily liable for the debt. Fourth, no injustice must be done by allowing subrogation. Id. § 96[b], 
at 463. 
130. JERRY, supra note l, § 96[b]. 
131. 6A APPLEMAN, supra note 34, § 4052, at 128-29. 
132. Great Lakes Transit Corp. v. Steamship Co., 301 U.S. 646, 654 (1937); Fa" Man & Co., 
903 F.2d at 879; United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Williams, 676 F. Supp. 123, 126 (E.D. La. 
1987); Employers of Wausau v. Purex Corp., 476 F. Supp. 140, 143 (E.D. Pa. 1979); United 
States Natl. Bank of Or. v. American Home Assurance Co., 347 F. Supp. 311, 313 (D. Or. 1972), 
ajfd., 505 F.2d 742, 744 (9th Cir. 1974). These cases recognize that pursuant to conventional 
subrogation, discussed supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text, parties can successfully mod-
ify subrogation rights in contracts regardless of equitable considerations. See generally JERRY, 
supra note 1, § 96[b]. 
133. See, e.g., Great Lakes Transit, 301 U.S. at 654; Fa" Man & Co., 903 F.2d at 878; St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Murray Plumbing & Heating Corp., 135 Cal. Rptr. 120, 126 (Ct. 
App. 1976); Home Ins. Co. v. Pinski Bros., 500 P.2d 945, 949 (Mont. 1972); Pennsylvania Gen. 
Ins. Co. v. Austin Power Co., 480 N.Y.S.2d 88, 91 (Sup. Ct. 1984), order revd., 496 N.Y.S.2d 173 
(1985), modified, 502 N.E.2d 982 (N.Y. 1986) (all stating general rule that insurer cannot main-
tain subrogation action against its own insured); see also 6A APPLEMAN, supra note 34, § 4055; 
JERRY, supra note 1, § 96[g]. 
An exception to this general prohibition could be written into insurance policies for volunta-
rily intoxicated insureds who commit intentional acts. See supra notes 130-31 and accompany-
ing text. However, this Note analyzes whether insurers should be able to maintain equitable 
subrogation actions against their insureds. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text. 
134. See., e.g., Medical Protective Co. v. Bell, 716 F. Supp. 392, 400 (W.D. Mo. 1989), revd., 
912 F.2d 244 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 970 (1991); Stafford Metal Works, Inc. v. 
Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 418 F. Supp., 56, 58-59 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Pinski Bros., 500 P.2d at 
949 (all discussing rationale behind prohibition set out infra notes 135-36, 148-50, 157 and ac-
companying text). 
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tion actions against insureds may create serious conflicts of interest. 135 
This problem arises particularly in situations where an insurance com-
pany insures both the wrongdoer and the injured party under different 
policies. 136 For example, in Stafford Metal Works, Inc. v. Cook Paint 
and Varnish Co., 137 Cook Paint and Varnish Co. (Cook) allegedly sup-
plied Stafford Metal Works (Stafford) with defective insulation, caus-
ing a fire in Stafford's plant.138 Stafford recovered property damages 
under a fire insurance policy issued to it by Continental Casualty Co. 
(Continental). 139 Continental then filed a subrogation action against 
the alleged tortfeasor, Cook, for the amount paid under the fire insur-
ance policy. 140 However, Continental had issued a liability policy to 
Cook agreeing to defend Cook in any suit seeking to hold Cook liable 
for property damage.141 Thus, Continental had a duty to defend Cook 
in the subrogation action it brought against Cook.142 
The court prohibited the subrogation action, noting that it pro-
vided too many opportunities for conflicts of interest.143 Continental 
used its in-house counsel to pursue its subrogation claim against Cook 
while hiring outside counsel for Cook's defense.144 This decision 
raised suspicions regarding the independence of Cook's counsel given 
that the attorney was being paid by Continental. The court pointed 
out that Cook's attorneys performed no discovery while defending 
Cook14s and suggested that this situation presented a new type of con-
flict of interest: the "insurer might play favorites between its in-
sureds." 146 Based on these fears, the court concluded that public 
policy required it to prohibit the insurer from bringing a subrogation 
action against its insured.147 
A second concern is that permitting insurers to sue their own in-
sureds would allow insurance companies to avoid responsibility for 
135. See, e.g., Keystone Paper Converters v. Neemar, 562 F. Supp. 1046, 1050 (E.D. Pa. 
1983); Stafford Metal Works, 418 F. Supp. at 62-63; Pinski Bros., 500 P.2d at 949 (all noting that 
permitting insurers to sue insureds would created impermissible conflicts of interest). 
136. See, e.g., Stafford Metal Works, 418 F. Supp. at 56 (discussed infra text accompanying 
notes 137-147); see also Zager, supra note 128, at 821-22. 
137. 418 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Tex. 1976). 
138. 418 F. Supp. at 57. 
139. 418 F. Supp. at 57. 
140. 418 F. Supp. at 57. 
141. 418 F. Supp. at 57. 
142. 418 F. Supp. at 57. 
143. See 418 F. Supp. at 62-63. 
144. 418 F. Supp. at 63. 
145. See 418 F. Supp. at 63. 
146. 418 F. Supp. at 63. 
147. See 418 F. Supp. at 63. See generally Employers Casualty Co. v. Tilley, 496 S.W.2d 
552, 557-59 (Tex. 1973) (discussing proper steps an attorney must follow when conflict of interest 
arises between insurer and insured). 
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coverage that their insureds had purchased. 148 Insurance companies 
include the risk of loss due to an insured's own negligence in their 
calculations of premiums.149 Therefore, if insurers could maintain 
subrogation actions against negligent insureds, they could recover 
money they had previously agreed to pay the insured.150 
Chenoweth Motor Co. v. Cotton 151 illustrates this concern. Che-
noweth Motor Company loaned the defendant an automobile while 
the defendant's car was being repaired. 152 The defendant negligently 
caused damage to the borrowed vehicle. 153 Chenoweth's insurance 
company paid for the repairs and then brought suit to recover from 
the defendant the amount paid.154 The court found that the defend-
ant, as bailee of Chenoweth, was an insured under the terms of the 
Motor Company's insurance policy.155 Since the policy included cov-
erage for negligently caused damage, a suit allowing the insurance 
company to recover from the defendant "would clearly be permitting 
an insurance company to avoid coverage of its own insured, which the 
insured had previously paid for." 156 Thus, courts worry that allowing 
subrogation actions against insureds would "give judicial sanction to 
the breach of the insurance policy by the insurer . . . and constitute 
judicial approval of a breach of the insurer's relationship with its own 
insured."157 These public policy reasons lead courts to prohibit insur-
ers from seeking reimbursement from their insureds. 
148. See, e.g., Federal Ins. Co. v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 117 F.2d 794, 796 (5th Cir. 
1941); Medical Protective Co. v. Bell, 716 F. Supp. 392, 400 (W.D. Mo. 1989), revd .. 912 F.2d 
244 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 970 (1991); Stafford Metal Works. 418 F. Supp. at 
58-59; Home Ins. Co. v. Pinski Bros., 500 P.2d 945, 949 (Mont. 1972); Rural Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Peterson, 395 N.W.2d 776, 779 (Wis. 1986) (all noting that permitting insurers to sue insureds 
allows insurers to avoid providing coverage insureds purchased); see also Cuttler, supra note 19, 
at 163-64. See generally JERRY, supra note 1, § 96[g]. 
149. Tamiami Trail Tours, 117 F.2d at 796; Stafford Metal Works. 418 F. Supp. at 58. 
150. Great Lakes Transit Corp. v. Steamship Co., 301 U.S. 646, 654 (1937); Farr Man & Co. 
v. M/V Rozita, 903 F.2d 871, 878 (1st Cir. 1990); Stafford Metal Works. 418 F. Supp. at 58; 
Pinski Bros., 500 P.2d at 949. 
151. 207 N.E.2d 412 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1965). 
152. 207 N.E.2d at 413. 
153. 207 N.E.2d at 413. 
154. 207 N.E.2d at 413. 
155. See 201 N.E.2d at 413. 
156. 207 N.E.2d at 413; see also Middlesex Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ballard, 148 So. 2d 865 (La. 
Ct. App. 1963) (reaching the same conclusion under similar fact pattern). 
157. Medical Protective Co. v. Bell, 716 F. Supp. 392, 400 (W.D. Mo. 1989) revd .. 912 F.2d 
244 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 970 (1991); see also Keystone Paper Convertors v. 
Neemar, 562 F. Supp. 1046, 1050 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Royal Exchanger Assurance v. Adams, 510 F. 
Supp, 581, 583 (W.D. Wash. 1981); Stafford Metal Works v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 418 F. 
Supp. 56, 58-59 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Home Ins. Co. v. Pinski Bros., 500 P.2d 945, 949 (Mont. 
1972). 
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2. A Recent Departure: Some Courts Make an Exception for 
Intentional Injuries 
Courts have begun to recognize that, in the context of intentional 
injuries, the subrogation principle of placing financial responsibility on 
the wrongdoer outweighs the policies behind the general rule prohibit-
ing insurer subrogation actions against insureds.158 The New Jersey 
Supreme Court provided support for this view in Ambassador Insur-
ance Co. v. Montes. 159 Ambassador Insurance was obligated to defend 
its insured, who intentionally set a building on fire, because the in-
sured's policy did not contain an express intentional injury exclusion 
clause. 160 However, the court permitted Ambassador to assert a right 
of subrogation against the insured.161 The court emphasized that eq-
uity requires that financial responsibility be placed on "the person who 
in good conscience should pay."162 Whether the wrongdoer was an 
insured or a third party was irrelevant.163 Underlying the Ambassador 
court's decision is the principle that insureds cannot insure themselves 
against the economic consequences of intentional wrongdoing.164 Be-
cause the insurance policy at issue did not contain an intentional in-
jury exclusion clause, subrogation provided a way for the court to 
uphold this principle.165 
Similarly, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in Madsen v. Thresher-
men 's Mutual Insurance Co. 166 recently allowed an insurer to recover 
from its insured the damages paid to the owner of a building that the 
insured had intentionally burned. The court pointed out: 
In this instance, ... adhering to [the traditional rule prohibiting insurers 
from seeking subrogation against their own insureds] would defeat a pur-
pose of subrogation, which is to ultimately place the loss on the wrong-
doer. Here, the wrongdoer and the insured are the same person .... 
158. Outside the area of voluntary intoxication, several commentators have suggested that 
allowing insurers to bring subrogation actions against insureds who commit intentional acts is 
the best way to accommodate the competing interests in compensating victims and punishing 
wrongdoers. See, e.g., Cuttler, supra note 19, at 167-68; John G. Fleming, Notes of Cases, Insur-
ance for the Criminal, 34 Moo. L. REV. 176, 179-80 (1971). 
159. 388 A.2d 603 (N.J. 1978). 
160. 388 A.2d at 605. 
161. See 388 A.2d at 607-08. 
162. 388 A.2d at 606. 
163. The court implicitly concluded that principles of equity outweigh all policy reasons 
arguing against insurer subrogation actions against insureds. Thus, the court felt it more impor-
tant to hold wrongdoers responsible for their actions than to prevent possible conflicts of interest. 
See 388 A.2d at 606-07. 
164. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
165. Also implicit in the court's discussion was its belief that, notwithstanding the absence of 
an intentional injury exclusion clause, Ambassador did not intend this act to be covered by the 
policy. Accordingly, Ambassador did not include the risk of insureds committing intentional 
acts in calculating its insurance premiums. See 388 A.2d at 605-06. 
166. 439 N.W.2d 607 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988), review denied, 443 N.W.2d 311 (Wis. 1989). 
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Thus, requiring [the insured] to reimburse [the insurer] would appropri-
ately place the loss on the wrongdoer.167 
The court implicitly concluded that, in cases involving intentional 
acts, this policy concern outweighed the reasons behind the traditional 
rule. 
B. Extending the Exception to Voluntarily Intoxicated Insureds 
The policy interest of holding a wrongdoer responsible discussed in 
Ambassador and Madsen also outweighs the concerns behind the gen-
eral prohibition on insurer subrogation actions against voluntarily in-
toxicated insureds who commit intentional acts. This section analyzes 
why principles of equity support insurer subrogation rights against all 
insureds who commit otherwise intentional actions while voluntarily 
intoxicated. It argues that subrogation also corrects the deficiency in 
the cqrrent voluntary intoxication defense when applied to nonalco-
holic insureds by adequately accommodating both the public interest 
in victim compensation and the interest in deterring wrongdoers. 
However, evidence indicates that subrogation may not adequately de-
ter alcoholic insureds from committing intentional acts while intoxi-
cated. Consequently, this section concludes that, despite principles of 
equity, subrogation should be rejected as the sole alternative to the 
current voluntary intoxication defense for alcoholic insureds. 
1. Subrogation: A Solution to the Intentional Injury Exclusion 
Clause Loophole 
Public policy supports recognition of insurer subrogation rights 
against insureds who commit otherwise intentional acts while volunta-
rily intoxicated.168 "[S]ubrogation is . . . an equitable mechanism to 
force the ultimate satisfaction of an obligation by the person who in 
good conscience should pay."169 Thus, a right of reimbursement 
against these insureds would fulfill equity's requirement that loss be 
placed on the responsible party.Ho 
Further, courts' concerns that allowing insurer subrogation rights 
167. 439 N.W.2d at 610 (citation omitted); see also West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. DeLong, 451 
N.W.2d 805 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam) (holding that an insurer could maintain a subro-
gation action against its own insured who was convicted of arson because of the strong public 
policy interest in placing the loss on the wrongdoer), review denied, 451 N.W.2d 298 (Wis. 1990). 
168. This discussion assumes that courts use the inferred intent standard to determine 
whether an act was otherwise intentional. See supra text accompanying note 124. 
169. Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 388 A.2d 603, 607 (N.J. 1978); see also Camden Trust 
Co. v. Cramer, 40 A.2d 601, 603 (N.J. 1945) ("Subrogation is a device adopted by equity to 
compel the ultimate discharge of an obligation by him who in good conscience ought to pay it."). 
This rule does not expressly require that the wrongdoer and the insured be two different people. 
170. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text. Providing for subrogation in lieu of 
denying the defense to people like Mr. X will save courts the difficulty of determining insureds' 
motives behind committing intentional acts while voluntarily intoxicated. See supra text accom-
panying note 116. However, courts will still face the task of determining whether the insured is 
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against insureds would allow insurers to avoid coverage of risks their 
insureds purchased is not present here. Insurance only protects poli-
cyholders, against the economic consequences of fortuitous circum-
stances.171 Insurers do not include risk of intentional wrongdoing in 
calculating their insurance premiums.172 Accordingly, because insur-
ance companies do not insure against intentional acts, no reason exists 
to treat insureds differently from any other intentional wrongdoer. 
The insured stands in the same position as a third-party tortfeasor in 
this situation. 
Allowing insurers a right of reimbursement against insureds who 
consume alcohol to avoid :financial responsibility also corrects a defi-
ciency in the current voluntary intoxication defense. The defense pro-
motes the public interest in victim compensation at the expense of 
deterrence. 173 Subrogation, though, should act to deter intentional 
wrongdoers like Mr. X who become intoxicated to avoid liability for 
premeditated intentional acts174 while still providing compensation to 
injured victims. 175 Mr. X considered the fact that he could receive 
coverage under the voluntary intoxication loophole in the intentional 
an alcoholic and therefore entitled to choose between subrogation and treatment. See infra note 
230 and accompanying text. 
Several commentators who have analyzed the impact of insanity on the intentional injury 
exclusion clause advocate insurer rights of reimbursement against insureds who suffer self-in-
duced mental derangement - i.e., mental incapacity due to the effects of voluntarily ingested 
drugs or alcohol. See, e.g., Olsson, supra note 34, at 1054-55 (suggesting that Arizona could 
balance the competing interests of deterrence and victim compensation by adopting a right of 
reimbursement for self-induced mental incapacity in conjunction with the Ruvolo insanity deter-
mination test). But see Salton, supra note 12, at 1061-62 n.268. Salton rejects the notion of 
insurer subrogation rights against insureds, relying on the standard rule discussed supra notes 
133-36, 148-50, 157 and accompanying text. Salton, however, overlooks the equitable principles 
behind subrogation that demand its application to intentional injuries. Thus, although Ap-
pleman states that as a general rule insurers cannot maintain subrogation actions against their 
insureds, 6A APPLEMAN, supra note 34, § 4055, he acknowledges that "[t]he right of subroga-
tion, or more properly called indemnification where sought from its own insured, is enforced 
where it would be inequitable to deny such remedy." SB APPLEMAN, supra note 34, § 4945, at 
104-05. 
171. See supra notes 12, 34 and accompanying text. 
172. See supra note 34. 
173. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
174. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
175. See Cuttler, supra note 19, at 169; Olsson, supra note 34, at 1054. The threat of subro-
gation will not deter Mr. X if he is judgment-proof. However, equity mandates that the victim 
not bear the risk that wrongdoers will be judgment-proof. As between the insurer and the victim, 
the insurer can better bear the risk of not recovering from the wrongdoer. The insurer will 
spread the loss over all of its insureds in the form of slightly higher premiums while the victim 
would bear the whole loss himself. 
This concern led states to pass legislation requiring liability policies to contain a "bankruptcy 
provision." This provision provides that "the insured's insolvency ... does not relieve the in-
surer of its obligations." JERRY, supra note l, § 95[c]. The subrogation proposal here should 
include a provision obligating insurers to provide coverage for intentional acts committed by 
nonalcoholic insureds like Mr. X regardless of whether insurers will subsequently be able to 
recover from their insureds. 
The impact of possible criminal liability on Mr. X's decision is beyond the scope of this Note. 
See supra note 108. However, any deterrence attributable to criminal responsibility should still 
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injury exclusion clause when deciding to commit an intentional act. 176 
Subrogation closes the loophole by holding voluntarily intoxicated in-
sureds responsible for otherwise intentional acts. Accordingly, Mr. X 
will be less likely to commit the act. 
Subrogation will also address deterrence missing in the current 
scheme where a nonalcoholic insured, rather than drinking as an ex-
cuse to commit an intentional act, unintentionally loses control after 
consuming alcohol and intentionally harms someone. The current de-
fense allows nonalcoholic insureds to ignore the consequences of 
drinking too much.177 If they lose control and harm someone, their 
insurance companies will take responsibility. Although these insureds, 
unlike Mr. X, may not be able to control themselves at the time they 
act, 178 they should still be held responsible for their actions. They vol-
untarily chose to consume alcohol to the point of losing control.179 
Consequently, the policy reasons behind subrogation still retain force 
here. 180 By redistributing responsibility to these insureds, subrogation 
should help deter nonalcoholics from drinking excessively in the fu-
ture to the point of losing control and committing an intentional 
act.181 
2. Subrogation Alone: An Inadequate Deterrent for Alcoholics 
Subrogation actions against alcoholic insureds who commit other-
wise intentional acts while intoxicated will also satisfy equity's man-
date that loss be placed on the responsible party. However, it is 
unclear whether threatening alcoholics182 with financial responsibility 
will deter them so as to correct the deficiency in the current voluntary 
intoxication defense. This section presents the arguments made on 
influence Mr. X despite his insolvency. Thus, allowing subrogation in the case of judgment-proof 
insureds may not come at the complete expense of deterrence. 
176. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
177. The deterrence impact of potential criminal liability is beyond the scope of this Note. 
See sµpra note 108. 
178. See infra notes 192-93 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 189-91 and accompa-
nying text (arguing that alcoholics should be held responsible for their acts). The same reasoning 
should apply to nonalcoholics. 
179. Although courts that reject the voluntary intoxication defense take this view, supra sec-
tion II.A, they fail to recognize the questionable deterrent effect of imposing financial liability on 
alcoholics. See infra notes 194-204 and accompanying text; see also supra note 170. 
180. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text. 
181. See supra text accompanying note 114. Equity's requirement that loss be placed on the 
responsible party, supra text accompanying notes 129, 169-70, should outweigh any loss in deter-
ring first-time intentional wrongdoers. 
182. Experts have defined the term alcoholic in various ways. See, e.g., JOHN J. FAY, THE 
ALCOHOL/DRUG ABUSE DICTIONARY AND ENCYCLOPEDIA 6 (1988) ("a person unable to cor-
rect the physiological and other bodily disturbances which have accumulated as the result of his 
drinking"); LUKS, supra note 121, at 2 ("continual alcohol abusers"); George N. Thompson, The 
Psychiatry of Alcoholism, in ALCOHOLISM 452, 452-53 (George N. Thompson ed., 1956) ("any 
person who uses alcohol in amounts sufficient to impair his efficiency or to interfere with his 
occupational, social, or economic adjustment"). 
2144 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:2113 
both sides of the issue and concludes that subrogation should be re-
jected as the sole solution to the problems with the current defense. 
a. The view that alcoholics can be deterred. Many experts em-
phasize that alcoholism, 183 unlike mental illness, is a self-induced dis-
ease.184 Although alcoholics may not be able to control their current 
alcohol consumption, by seeking help for their drinking problem they 
can control their loss of mental capacity to appreciate wrongfulness. 185 
Studies show that the effects of alcohol on attitude and behavior can 
be cured through treatment.186 
Moreover, alcoholism has been described as an addiction which 
"feeds on itself."187 The more an alcoholic drinks, the more she needs 
to drink to get through her daily routine. The shock of committing a 
tortious act may be the impetus an alcoholic needs to realize that alco-
hol makes her life harder, not easier. She may be persuaded to get 
help to prevent another similar occurrence.188 
Further, it is not evident that alcoholics who commit intentional 
acts while voluntarily intoxicated lack the requisite intent at the time 
they act. Experts note that many alcoholics never commit crimes 
while intoxicated.189 "Despite frequent recourse to, and dependence 
183. FAY, supra note 182, defines alcoholism as 
a chronic and usually progressive disease, or a symptom of an underlying psychological or 
physical disorder, characterized by dependence on alcohol (manifested by loss of control 
over drinking) for relief from psychological or physical distress or for gratification from 
alcohol intoxication itself, and by a consumption of alcoholic beverages sufficiently great 
and consistent to cause physical or mental or social or economic disability •..• 
Id. at 6; see also West, supra note 122, at 1 ("Alcoholism is an illness caused by the prolonged 
ingestion of ethyl alcohol ••. and manifested by a variety of harmful physical, mental, behav-
ioral, and social effects."). 
184. See LUKS, supra note 121, at 4; Kaplan, supra note 123, at 87; Jack H. Mendelson & 
Nancy K. Mello, Diagnostic Criteria for Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse, in THE DIAGNOSIS AND 
TREATMENT OF ALCOHOLISM, supra note 121, at 1, 1-2; West, supra note 122, at 7; Wolf, supra 
note 123, at 28, 55 (all taking the view that "alcoholism" is a self-induced disease); see also DON 
CAHALAN, UNDERSTANDING AMERICA'S DRINKING PROBLEM 61-62 (1987) ("[A] substantial 
number of people have regarded alcoholism as both self-imposed and a disease."); JAMES E. 
ROYCE, ALCOHOL PROBLEMS AND ALCOHOLISM 162 (1981) ("It is naive to argue that alcohol-
ism cannot be a disease because it is self-inflicted; any experienced physician has seen many self· 
inflicted illnesses."). See generally E.M. JELLINEK, THE DISEASE CONCEPT OF ALCOHOLISM 
45-52 (1960). 
185. See, e.g., FORREST, supra note 121, at 22 (arguing that alcoholics cannot stop drinking 
and recover without long-term treatment); HARRISON M. TRICE, ALCOHOLISM !N AMERICA 38, 
107 (1966) (emphasizing that physiological effects such as lack of memory and loss of control can 
only be cured through treatment). 
186. Wolf, supra note 123, at 41. 
187. LUKS, supra note 121, at 69. 
188. "Traditional thinking believed there was no way to break [the alcoholic's] cycle. The 
alcoholic could be treated successfully only when he wanted help; he had to hit his 'bottom' first, 
be truly suffering." Id. Committing a tortious act may be sufficient to trigger a cry for help. 
189. See, e.g., Joseph Hirsh, Public Health and Social Aspects of Alcoholism, in ALCOHOLISM, 
supra note 182, at 3, 36; Niven, supra note 115, at 109 ("It is important to recognize .•• that a 
large percentage of alcohol users experience no problems with its use."). 
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on, alcohol they do not commit crimes unless criminality is part of 
their character and personality."190 Accordingly, financial responsi-
bility should deter alcoholics to the same extent it deters any other 
criminal from committing intentional acts. Because intentional 
tortfeasors behave analogously to criminals, this argument should ap-
ply likewise to alcoholics who commit intentional torts. 191 
Experts also suggest that "some individuals learn to expect to be-
have more aggressively when drinking and act so regardless of the dis-
inhibiting effect of alcohol itself."192 If these injurers faced economic 
consequences of their wrongdoing, they might change their expecta-
tions and control their aggressive behavior despite their intoxicated 
state. Finally, even if voluntarily intoxicated tortfeasors facing finan-
cial responsibility refuse to admit that they have a drinking problem 
and continue their destructive behavior, the risk of financial liability 
may help dissuade some people from starting to drink excessively.193 
Thus, in the long run, the threat of financial responsibility will cause a 
decrease in the number of intentional acts committed by voluntarily 
intoxicated insureds. 
b. The view that alcoholics cannot be deterred. Other studies 
conclude that placing financial responsibility on alcoholics will not de-
ter them from drinking and committing intentional harmful acts. 194 
190. Hirsh, supra note 189, at 36 (emphasis omitted); see also COLLINS, supra note 123, at 
23-24. Collins expresses skepticism over whether crimes involving alcohol occur because of the 
alcohol or in spite of it. "[A]lcohol has been blamed for problems in the absence of sufficient 
justification. There is a tendency, for example, to assume .•. that the mere presence of alcohol in 
an assaultive encounter was responsible for the assault." Id. at 24. 
191. See supra notes 27-31, 108 and accompanying text. 
192. Niven, supra note 115, at 107. Joan F. McCord, Alcohol in the Service of Aggression, in 
ALCOHOL, DRUG ABUSE AND AGGRESSION, supra note 115, at 270, 277-78, conducted a study 
to evaluate the effects of alcoholism on aggressiveness. Elementary school teachers were asked to 
describe boy subjects as aggressive or nonaggressive. Forty years later, McCord identified the 
subjects as alcoholic or nonalcoholic. She then looked at their conviction records to study links 
between aggression, alcohol, and crime. McCord found that both early aggression and alcohol-
ism contributed to the probability of being convicted of a crime. However while aggressiveness 
appeared to be more closely tied to crimes involving unintentional injuries, alcoholism appeared 
to be more closely related to crimes involving intentional iajuries. McCord concluded that some 
of the subjects consumed alcohol to provide an excuse for their unlawful intentional acts. "The 
intentional nature of the crimes for which aggressive alcoholics had been convicted suggests that 
at least some of these men use alcohol to permit the expression of their aggression." Id. at 278. 
193. See, e.g., Ernest P. Noble, Prevention of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, in ALCOHOLISM 
AND RELATED PROBLEMS, supra note 115, at 140, 169 (acknowledging that some experts main-
tain that legal sanctions including threats of fines dissuade alcoholics from committing unlawful 
acts). Studies also show that increasing the price of alcohol causes some people to reduce their 
consumption levels and not develop alcoholism. See, e.g., CAHALAN, supra note 184, at 89, 115 
(noting that increases in alcohol taxes reduce alcohol consumption); ROYCE, supra note 184, at 
182 (citing studies that show that increases in the price of alcohol prevent some people from 
consuming the large amounts of alcohol necessary to develop alcoholism). Because intentional 
tortious acts usually also constitute crimes, supra note 108, individuals may consider both the 
risk of financial liability and the risk of criminal liability in deciding to start drinking. The 
deterrent impact of possible criminal responsibility is beyond the scope of this Note. 
194. See e.g., GARY G. FORRESf & ROBERT H. GORDON, SUBSTANCE ABUSE, HOMICIDE, 
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For example, several criminal law studies, evaluating the effects of 
tougher drunk driving laws, reveal that alcohol problems decline only 
in the short run.195 Once "the novelty effects wear off and the . . . 
publicity diminish[es],"196 individuals drive while intoxicated just as 
often as before the new laws went into effect.197 Experts supporting 
this view emphasize that alcohol abusers suffer physiological effects, 
including memory loss, weakening of social restraints, impairment of 
psychomotor skills, and decreasing mental capacity, over which they 
have no control.198 As a result, intoxication involuntarily increases a 
person's likelihood of committing an intentional harmful act.199 
Furthermore, legal sanctions do not prevent alcoholics from re-
peating deviant behavior because alcohol abusers continue to deny 
that they have a drinking problem.200 Alcoholics may deny all memo-
ries of the event in question201 or try to blame the victim for what 
happened. 202 These studies conclude that neither criminal punish-
ment nor financial threats will cause alcohol abusers to alter their 
drinking patterns.203 Treatment is the only solution.204 
AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 119 (1990) ("(P]unishment rarely 'works' as a deterrent to alcoholism 
and chemical dependency, and thus [it] will not be effective in •.. successfully rehabilitating 
addicted or substance·abusing offenders ...• "); Ross & LIGHTFOOT, supra note 115, at 5-6 
(arguing that punishment may not serve as a deterrent for persons convicted of alcohol-related 
crimes); ROYCE, supra note 184, at 310-11 ("[L]egal sanctions to control intoxication have been 
found ineffective .... "); Noble, supra note 193, at 168-69 (pointing out that stronger drunk 
driving penalties have no long-term deterrent effect on drunk drivers). These same arguments 
should apply when courts award punitive damages to punish intentional tortfeasors who act 
while intoxicated. See supra note 108. 
195. Noble, supra note 193, at 169. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. Philip J. Cook, The Economics of Alcohol Consumption and Abuse, in ALCOHOLISM 
AND RELATED PROBLEMS, supra note 115, at 56, 60; Mendelson & Mello, supra note 184, at 11-
12; Wolf, supra note 123, at 35. 
199. Cook, supra note 198, at 60. 
200. See Luxs, supra note 121, at 105 (discussing the difficulty in getting alcoholics to admit 
that they have a problem); Mendelson & Mello, supra note 184, at 2 ("The stigma usually associ-
ated with alcoholism has led to denial by the patient .... "). 
201. See, e.g .. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sherrill, 566 F. Supp. 1286, 1287 (E.D. Mich. 1983), a.ffd., 
735 F.2d 1363 (6th Cir. 1984) (no recollection of abducting victim at gunpoint and sexually 
assaulting her while intoxicated); Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Kerwin, 576 
N.E.2d 94, 96 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (no recollection of altercation with victim or of subsequently 
shooting victim while drunk); Economy Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 427 N.W.2d 742, 742 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (insured could not recall stabbing girlfriend's visitor with knife and fork 
while intoxicated); see also Ross & LIGHTFOOT, supra note 115, at 41 (noting that people suffer 
memory impairment when they are intoxicated); ROYCE, supra note 184, at 60-61 (explaining 
that people who consume alcohol may not remember events occurring while they were intoxi-
cated because the alcohol caused a temporary failure of the memory-storage processes of the 
brain). 
202. Luxs, supra note 121, at 105; see also TRICE, supra note 185, at 33 (noting that problem 
drinkers often blame others for driving them to drink). 
203. Sheila B. Blume, Public Policy Issues: A Summary, in ALCOHOLISM AND RELATED 
PROBLEMS, supra note 115, at 176, 186; see also supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
204. Blume, supra note 203, at 186. 
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C. Coercive Alcohol Treatment: An Alternative to Subrogation 
There is enough doubt among experts regarding financial responsi-
bility's deterrent effect on alcoholics that subrogation should be re-
jected as the sole alternative to the current voluntary intoxication 
defense. Alcoholics can control the physiological effects of alcohol on 
themselves only by ceasing to drink..205 Thus, until alcohol abusers 
enter treatment programs, there may be no way to deter their alcohol-
induced deviant behavior. 
This section proposes a modification to the current voluntary in-
toxication defense that accommodates the competing public policy in-
terests in compensating victims and in deterring wrongdoers. States 
should adopt legislation granting insurers subrogation rights against 
insureds who commit otherwise intentional acts while voluntarily in-
toxicated, subject to an exception for alcoholic insureds who success-
fully complete alcohol treatment programs. This section analyzes the 
success of state statutory schemes that mandate alcohol treatment for 
alcoholic welfare recipients and convicted drunk drivers and con-
cludes that similar legislation will work equally well in the insurance 
context. 
1. The Success of Coercive Alcohol Treatment Programs 
Society has recognized that alcoholics may never get help unless 
they are forced to do so.206 Consequently, states have passed statutes 
outside the area of insurance law compelling alcoholics to seek treat-
ment. 207 For example, some states require alcoholics on public assist-
205. See, e.g., CAHALAN, supra note 184, at 134, 139 (pointing out that the traditional Al-
coholics Anonymous model insists on total abstinence as the only way to effectively treat alcohol-
ism); ROYCE, supra note 184, at 171 (noting that, although a body can return to normal after 
years of sobriety, any experimentation with drinking can cause a recovered alcoholic to digress to 
the stage he was at when he quit drinking); TRICE, supra note 185, at 38, 107 (emphasizing that 
physiological effects such as lack of memory, loss of control, and convulsions can only be cured 
through treatment aimed at complete abstinence). But see, e.g., CAHALAN, supra note 184, at 
134-36 (citing a study conducted by the Rand Corporation which found that recovering al-
coholics returned to "normal drinking" 18 months after treatment "without apparent medical or 
social consequences." However, a second report evaluating alcoholics four years after treatment 
found much more frequent relapse. Fifty-one percent had returned to the same center for 
treatment.). 
206. See LUKS, supra note 121, at 69; see also LECLAIR BISSELL & PAUL w. HABERMAN, 
ALCOHOLISM IN THE PROFESSIONS 83 (1984) ("When home remedies have failed, the alcoholic 
may be forced by others ... to seek.help."); ROYCE, supra note 184, at 216-17 (noting the 
effectiveness of group confrontation as a way to force an alcoholic to seek treatment); TRICE, 
supra note 185, at 109 (pointing out that " '[f]ew if any alcoholics decide to stop drinking until 
some pressure is put on them, such as threatened loss of job [or] family ... .'" (quoting Freder-
ick Lemere et al., Motivation in the Treatment of Alcoholism, 19 Q.J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 428, 
430 (1958))). 
207. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 23205 (West 1985) (allowing judges to impose alcohol 
treatment in traffic cases if the convicted would benefit); FLA. STAT. ch. 948.03(6)(a) (1991) 
(requiring alcohol treatment as a condition of probation); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2 ~ 6360-2 
(Smith-Hurd 1988 & Supp. 1992) (requiring alcohol treatment as a condition of probation); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24D (West 1988) (requiring convicted drunk drivers to enter 
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ance to seek treatment. In this context, alcoholics are defined as those 
people who are unable to remain gainfully employed because of 
drinkin 208 g. 
States also allow judges to order alcoholics who disrupt the family 
relationship to seek treatment or face legal sanctions, including a jail 
sentence or a court order not to return home.209 A New York judge 
recently required a juvenile delinquent to reside in a treatment center 
"to assist [the youth] in effectively addressing the attitudes and cir-
cumstances which have led to his ... [alcohol] abuse."210 The court 
noted that the child's condition required enrollment in an alcohol re-
habilitation program. 211 
Most states require convicted drunk drivers to enter alcohol treat-
ment programs or face harsher penalties including heavier fines or jail 
terms.212 Oregon goes so far as to allow judges to require any person 
convicted of a crime committed while intoxicated to attend an alcohol 
treatment program if the judge "has probable cause to believe the per-
son is an alcoholic or problem drinker and would benefit from treat-
alcohol treatment programs); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-179.1 (1991) (authorizing judge to order 
alcohol treatment for convicted drunk drivers as condition of probation); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 430.850 (1989) (allowing court to require any defendant convicted of a crime committed while 
intoxicated to enter alcohol treatment program); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 9754(c)(l2) (1982) 
(allowing court to attach participation in an alcohol treatment program as a condition of proba-
tion); see also Jeffrey C. Filcik, Recent Developments, Signs of the Times: Scarlet Letter Proba-
tion Conditions, 37 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTBMP. L. 291, 307 & n.57 (1990) (explaining that 
some states require judges to impose mandatory attendance at alcohol treatment programs on 
convicted defendants who are alcoholics). 
208. See. e.g., N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 385.2(g)(2) (1991). This section 
requires public assistance recipients, deemed unemployable for medical reasons, to accept the 
medical care necessary to restore employability or lose their aid. New York courts have inter-
preted "medical care" to include alcohol treatment for people who cannot maintain jobs because 
of drinking problems. See Hansen v. D'Elia, 450 N.Y.S.2d 874, 875 (App. Div. 1982). In Han-
sen, the Department of Social Services discontinued the petitioner's public assistance after he 
failed to comply with § 385's requirement that all employable recipients participate in a jobs 
program or forfeit their aid. The court acknowledged that the petitioner's alcohol problems 
could affect his employability and therefore exempt him from participation in the jobs program. 
The court ordered the Department to investigate the petitioner's situation, suggesting that, if the 
petitioner required alcohol treatment to be employable, he would be ordered to seek help. Id.: 
see also Lu.KS, supra note 121, at 69. 
209. See. e.g., LU.KS, supra note 121, at 71, 177 (interpreting DBL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, 
§ 950(5) (1975) to allow judges to order alcoholic family members disrupting the family relation-
ship to seek alcohol treatment); see also In re Patricia 0., 573 N.Y.S.2d 716, 717 (App. Div. 
1991) (terminating mother's parental rights after she failed to meet condition of seeking alcohol 
treatment). Some judges initiate their own coercive remedies. See, e.g., Janice Castro, A Judge 
Whose Ideas Nearly Got Him Killed, TIME, Mar. 9, 1992, at 12, 16 (interviewing Judge Howard 
Broadman of the Visalia, California Superior Court who developed his own coercive remedies 
including alcohol treatment for convicted drunk drivers and "Norplant" birth control implants 
for child abusers). 
210. In re Lyman M., 560 N.Y.S.2d 948, 952 (Fam. Ct. 1990). 
211. 560 N.Y.S.2d at 951-52. 
212. See supra note 207 for examples of states requiring convicted drunk drivers to seek 
alcohol abuse treatment. 
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ment . . " 213 Under most of these statutes, the court grants the 
defendant probation subject to the condition that he attend an alco-
holic treatment program.214 If the defendant fails to fulfill his obliga-
tion, the judge can revoke his probation and order him to serve a jail 
sentence.215 In effect, the defendant receives credit against a jail sen-
tence for successful attendance at and completion of a .substance abuse 
rehabilitation program.216 
Despite arguments that these measures violate the Eighth Amend-
ment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment, they have 
not been declared unconstitutional.217 Courts note that mandatory al-
cohol treatment cannot violate the Eighth Amendment because it is 
not punishment.218 Rather, it "is a means of necessary rehabilita-
tion."219 Alcoholic rehabilitation programs "increas[e] the likelihood 
that alcoholics will gain control over their decision[s]" not to commit 
crimes.220 
213. OR. R.Ev. STAT. § 430.850(1) (1989). An Ohio court has even stayed part of an attor-
ney's suspension from the practice oflaw (for failure to disclose his client's misrepresentations in 
bankruptcy court) on the condition that the attorney receive treatment for alcoholism. Colum-
bus Bar Assn. v. Wright, 568 N.E.2d 1218, 1218-19 (Ohio 1991) (per curiam). 
214. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 948.03(6) (1991) (failure to attend alcohol treatment program 
violates probation); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11 i 1/2 ~ 6360-2 (Smith-Hurd 1988 & Supp. 1992) 
(same); KY. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 198A.040(d) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) (failure of convicted 
drunk driver to complete treatment program reinstitutes all suspended penalties); N.C. GEN. 
STAT.§ 20-179.1 (1989) (failure of convicted drunk driver to attend substance abuse rehabilita-
tion program revokes probation); 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 9754(c)(l2) (1982) (court can 
order participation in alcohol treatment program as condition of probation). 
215. See, e.g., State v. Short Hom, 427 N.W.2d 361, 362-63 (S.D. 1988) (reinstating jail 
sentence where defendant was discharged from alcohol treatment program for a poor attitude 
toward treatment and aggressive behavior). 
216. Compare Commonwealth v. Conahan, 589 A.2d 1107, 1110 (Pa. 1991) (holding that 
convicted drunk driver was entitled to credit against mandatory jail term for time successfully 
served in an inpatient alcohol rehabilitation center) with Bryce v. State, 545 N.E.2d 1094 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1989) (reinstating jail sentence where defendant was terminated from a treatment pro-
gram due to lack of progress). 
217. See. e.g., State v. Reed, Case No. 1611, 1981 WL 5378, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 19, 
1981) (unpublished opinion) (holding that confinement at a drug treatment facility as a condition 
of probation did not violate the Eighth Amendment); Short Hom, 427 N.W.2d at 363 (rejecting 
defendant's argument that conditioning probation on completion of alcohol treatment program 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment); see also LUKS, supra note 121, at 71 (arguing that 
requiring attendance at an alcohol treatment program as a condition of probation does not vio-
late the Eighth Amendment). 
218. E.g., Short Hom, 427 N.W.2d at 363. 
219. Short Horn, 427 N.W.2d at 363; see also State v. Robinson, 399 N.W.2d 324, 327 (S.D. 
1987) (holding that it is humane to provide treatment that is required to cure any illness). Courts 
have held, however, that prohibiting alcoholics from consuming alcohol rather than ordering 
them to get help does violate the Eighth Amendment because it has the effect of punishing a 
defendant solely because he is an alcoholic. See, e.g., Wickham v. Dowd, 914 F.2d 1111, 1115 
(8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2897 (1991). 
220. Conahan, 589 A.2d at 1110; see a/so SlXTY-SIXTH AM. AssEMBLY ON PUBLIC POLICY 
ON ALCOHOL PROBLEMS, FINAL REPORT 8 (1984) (recommending that "[t]reatment should be 
much more extensively provided to alcoholic individuals within the criminal justice system. This 
will decrease the likelihood of criminal recidivism and thus reduce danger and cost to society."); 
FORREST & GORDON, supra note 194, at 121 (acknowledging that correctional alcohol rehabili-
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Experts have traditionally maintained that alcohol abuse treatment 
only succeeds if the abuser seeks help voluntarily.221 However, studies 
indicate that "[w]here legal or economic coercion has been employed 
to 'force' people into treatment, it is remarkable that such alcoholic 
persons do as well or better than those who allegedly seek treatment 
voluntarily."222 For example, a one-year evaluation of 288 alcoholics 
coerced into treatment at Minnesota's Hazelden Rehabilitation Center 
revealed that 79.2% of them completed treatment compared to 74% 
of voluntary patients.223 One year later 50.7% of court-referred pa-
tients and 49.4% of voluntary patients were still sober.224 
Therapists also indicate that successful completion of alcohol 
treatment programs depends more on the rehabilitation staff than on 
whether the alcoholic voluntarily sought help.22s Therapists must de-
velop supportive relationships with their patients.226 When they can 
convince court-referred patients that treatment benefits rather than 
punishes them, alcoholics will respond positively.22' 
tation programs can successfully reduce parole failure and recidivism); Ross & LIGHTFOOT, 
supra note 115, at 29-30 (rejecting conclusions of some researchers that alcohol treatment pro-
grams do not reduce recidivism and citing studies indicating that treatment can reduce recidi-
vism by as much as 60%). 
221. See, e.g., LUKS, supra note 121, at 69; E. Mansell Pattison, The Selection of Treatment 
Modalities for the Alcoholic Patient, in THE DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT OF ALCOHOLISM, 
supra note 121, at 189, 222; see also FORREST & GORDON, supra note 194, at 121 ("At best, ••• 
'forced' treatment [was] viewed as ineffective."); Ross & LIGHTFOOT, supra note 115, at 100 
(citing studies indicating the lack of success of compulsory treatment programs). 
222. Pattison, supra note 221, at 222; see also HERBERT FINGARETTE & ANN FINGARETTE 
HASSE, MENTAL DISABILmES AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 184 n.44 (1979) (noting studies 
that indicate that coercion is beneficial to the treatment of alcoholics); FORREST & GORDON, 
supra note 194, at 132 (Suggesting that forcing criminal homicide offenders to seek alcohol treat-
ment obtains better results than voluntary entry: "It should be noted that court-ordered or coer-
cive treatments have been successful."); Ross & LIGHTFOOT, supra note 115, at 101 
(acknowledging that coercion can be "essential" for successful treatment of alcoholics in the 
workforce); TRICE, supra note 185, at 108-09 (finding that treatment works best when an alco-
holic attends under threat of losing his family or job). 
223. LUKS, supra note 121, at 78-79. See generally J.C. LAUNDERGAN ET AL., ARE COURT 
REFERRALS EFFECTIVE? JUDICIAL COMMITMENT FOR CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY IN WASHING· 
TON CouNTY, MINNESOTA (1979) (discussing the research done at Hazelden). 
224. LUKS, supra note 121, at 79. A 1982 study in Minnesota and Wisconsin revealed that 
the number of patients still on welfare six months after treatment fell by 50% and was cut in half 
again one year after discharge. Id. at 89. Courts also recognize the success of court-mandated 
alcohol treatment. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Conahan, 589 A.2d 1107, 1109 (Pa. 1991) (find-
ing that defendant successfully completed alcohol treatment program and remained sober). 
225. See LUKS, supra note 121, at 80; see also Ross & LIGHTFOOT, supra note 115, at 111-12 
(indicating that the success of coercive alcohol treatment programs depends on a well-qualified, 
persistent stall); ROYCE, supra note 184, at 215-16 (pointing out that because forced treatment 
has been shown to work, a client's lack of motivation is the fault of the counselor). 
226. LuKS, supra note 121, at 80. 
227. "A 'positive treatment relationship' can be created with coerced alcoholics ..• if ther-
apists demonstrate that the patients are their main concern." Id. 
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2. The Extension of Coercive Alcohol Treatment Programs to 
Insurance Law 
Coercive alcohol treatment should be equally successful in the in-
surance context.228 Allowing alcoholic insureds who commit other-
wise intentional acts229 while voluntarily intoxicated to choose 
between financial responsibility and alcohol abuse treatment effectively 
accommodates the insurance law public policy interests in compensat-
ing injured victims and in deterring wrongdoers. Insureds who suffer 
from alcohol abuse may not be able to control the behavioral conse-
quences of their uncontrolled alcohol consumption even under threat 
of financial responsibility. This proposal recognizes that treatment 
may be the only solution.230 
Successful completion of coercive alcohol rehabilitation programs 
removes the impetus behind alcoholics' deviant acts.231 It restores 
their ability to control their behavior and to respond effectively to the 
threat of financial responsibility. Therefore, coercive alcohol treat-
ment not only immediately deters alcoholics from committing wrong-
ful acts, but it also restores the effectiveness of society's normal 
deterrent mechanisms on alcoholics.232 
The proposed solution still ensures that innocent victims of al-
coholics receive compensation from insurers. Insurance premiums, 
however, should not increase significantly. Under the current volun-
tary intoxication defense, insurers are often obligated to provide cover-
228. Intentional acts may also involve criminal sanctions. See supra note 108. If courts 
allowed mandatory treatment as an alternative to imprisonment, they could also credit it against 
a subrogation judgment. Coercive alcohol treatment would serve the same deterrent purpose in 
insurance law as it does in criminal law. 
229. The proposal requires courts to apply the inferred intent standard to determine whether 
an act was otherwise intentional - i.e., the act and resulting injuries would be intentional but for 
the wrongdoer's intoxicated state. See supra section I.B and text accompanying note 124. 
230. The proposal distinguishes between alcoholics and nonalcoholics. These labels are only 
used for purposes of clarity. Studies show that labeling individuals alcoholics often dissuades 
them from accepting treatment. See, e.g., Ross & LIGHTFOOT, supra note 115, at 102. Patients 
tend to respond more favorably to the term alcohol abusers. Id. Consequently, states should try 
to avoid including the word alcoholic in legislation describing those eligible for treatment. 
The procedure by which an insured will be determined to be an alcoholic or alcohol abuser 
and therefore eligible for treatment is beyond the scope of this Note. The proposal may en-
courage nonalcoholic insureds to try to plead alcoholism and avoid subrogation. However, con-
vincing a medical professional of a nonexistent drinking problem might be very difficult. More 
importantly, the disruption of life and social stigma attached to alcohol treatment should dis-
courage almost all such attempts. 
231. See supra text accompanying notes 198-99. 
232. Inpatient programs serve as an immediate deterrent by separating alcoholics from the 
rest of society whom they can harm. Outpatient programs closely monitor alcoholics' behavior 
to make sure they do not revert to their prior habits. Also, many court-referred alcoholics would 
face possible imprisonment resulting from the criminal aspect of their acts if they began drinking 
again. They would likely rather attend alcohol treatment sessions than be incarcerated. 
In the long run, successful treatment of alcoholism restores an alcoholic's ability to live nor-
mally in society. ROYCE, supra note 184, at 225, 270. At that point, a recovered alcoholic 
should respond effectively to normal deterrent mechanisms. 
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age to voluntarily intoxicated insureds with no chance of 
reimbursement. 233 In contrast, under this proposal, some alcoholic in-
sureds may elect the reimbursement option.234 Consequently, insurers 
may end up spending less money under this scheme.235 Also, these 
threats may deter some people from becoming alcoholics.236 Thus, in 
the long run, subrogation subject to an exception for alcoholics who 
successfully complete alcohol treatment may cause a decrease in the 
number of tortious acts committed and consequently a decrease in the 
amount of litigation over insurance coverage. 
CONCLUSION 
Intentional injury exclusion clauses in homeowner's policies ex-
clude coverage for intentionally caused harm. Many courts currently 
create an exception, though, for those insureds who act while too in-
toxicated to form the required intent. This exception not only con-
dones the behavior of nonalcoholic insureds who drink in order to 
avoid the economic consequences of their wrongdoing, but it also fails 
to help alcoholics who need treatment. Although the voluntary intox-
ication defense compensates victims, it does so at the expense of 
deterrence. 
States can correct this deficiency by adopting legislation granting 
insurers a right of reimbursement against insureds subject to an excep-
tion for alcoholic insureds who successfully complete alcohol treat-
ment programs. This proposal provides injured victims with 
compensation while effectively deterring insureds from committing in-
tentional acts. The threat of financial responsibility should not only 
deter premeditated wrongdoers from taking advantage of the current 
loophole in the intentional injury exclusion clause, but it should also 
help deter all nonalcoholic insureds from drinking to the point where 
they lose control and cause harm. 
Subrogation, however, may have no effect on insureds who cannot 
control their alcohol consumption or its consequences. Treatment 
may be the only way to stop alcoholics' deviant behavior. Thus, this 
proposal not only addresses insurance law public policy concerns, but 
233. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text for examples of cases where insurers 
were required to provide coverage for intentional acts committed by voluntarily intoxicated 
insureds. 
234. Legislation should include a requirement that insolvent alcoholic insureds cannot 
choose the subrogation alternative. 
235. The alcohol treatment programs should be funded by the states rather than by liability 
insurers' charging increased premiums. Alcoholics present a threat to everyone when intoxi-
cated. Accordingly, society as a whole, rather than just insureds, has an interest in helping 
alcoholics control their drinking problems. 
236. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
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directly responds to the need to ensure that alcoholics receive appro-
priate treatment for their illness before they do further harm to them-
selves or to society. 
